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The entries in this glossary are adapted from definitions provided by authoritative sources, such as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Additionality: A criterion sometimes applied to projects aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
It stipulates that the emission reductions accomplished by the project must not have happened anyway 
had the project not taken place.
Aerosols: Airborne solid or liquid particles, with a typical size of between 0.01 and 10 micrometer (a 
millionth of a meter) that reside in the atmosphere for at least several hours. They may influence the 
climate directly through scattering and absorbing radiation, and indirectly by modifying the optical 
properties and lifetime of clouds.
Annex I parties/countries: The group of countries listed in Annex I to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. Under Articles 4.2 (a) and 4.2 (b) of the convention, Annex I Parties were 
committed to adopting national policies and measures with the non-legally binding aim to return their 
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. By default, the other countries are referred to as Non-
Annex I Parties.
Biomass plus carbon capture and storage (BioCCS or BECCS): Use of energy produced from biomass where 
the combustion gases are then captured and stored underground or used, for example, in industrial processes. 
It excludes gases generated through, for example, a fermentation process (as opposed to combustion).
Biomass: The total mass of living organisms in a given area or volume, including products, by-products, 
and waste of biological origin (plants or animal matter) and excluding material embedded in geological 
formations and transformed to fossil fuels or peat.
Black carbon: The substance formed through the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels, biofuels, and 
biomass, which is emitted in both anthropogenic and naturally occurring soot. It consists of pure carbon in 
several linked forms. Black carbon warms the Earth by absorbing heat in the atmosphere and by reducing 
albedo – the ability to reflect sunlight – when deposited on snow and ice.
Bottom-up model: In the context of this assessment, a model that represents a system by looking at 
its detailed underlying parts. Compared to so-called top-down models, which focus on economic inter-
linkages, bottom-up models of energy use and emissions can provide greater resolution with regards to 
sectors or mitigation technologies.
Business-as-usual: A scenario that describes future greenhouse gas emission levels in the absence of 
additional mitigation efforts and policies (with respect to an agreed set).
Carbon dioxide emissions budget: For a given temperature rise limit, for example a 1.5 or 2 °C long-term 
limit, the corresponding carbon budget reflects the total amount of carbon emissions that can be emitted 
to stay within that limit. Stated differently, a carbon budget is the area under a greenhouse gas emissions 
trajectory that satisfies assumptions about limits on cumulative emissions estimated to avoid a certain 
level of global mean surface temperature rise.
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Carbon credits: An entitlement allocated by a government to a legal entity (company or other type of 
emitter) to emit a specified amount of a substance. These entitlements, which may be transferrable and 
tradable, can be used to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (by giving them a monetary value) or can 
be used for accounting of emissions.
Carbon dioxide equivalent: A way to place emissions of various radiative forcing agents on a common 
footing by accounting for their effect on climate. It describes, for a given mixture and amount of 
greenhouse gases, the amount of carbon dioxide that would have the same global warming ability, when 
measured over a specified time period. For the purpose of this report, greenhouse gas emissions (unless 
otherwise specified) are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, 
expressed as carbon dioxide equivalents assuming a 100-year global warming potential.
Carbon leakage: Phenomenon whereby the reduction in emissions (relative to a baseline) in a jurisdiction 
or sector associated with the implementation of mitigation policy is offset to some degree by an increase 
outside of that jurisdiction or sector which can be causally linked to the aforementioned reduction.
Conditional pledges: Greenhouse gas emissions reduction pledges made by some countries that are 
contingent on the ability of national legislatures to enact the necessary laws, ambitious action from other 
countries, realization of finance and technical support, or other factors.
Double counting: In the context of this assessment, double counting refers to a situation in which the 
same emission reductions are counted towards meeting two countries’ pledges.
Emission pathway: The trajectory of annual global greenhouse gas emissions over time.
Global warming potential: An index, based on the radiative properties of greenhouse gases, measuring 
the radiative forcing following a pulse emission of a unit mass of a given greenhouse gas in the present-day 
atmosphere integrated over a chosen time horizon, relative to that of carbon dioxide. The global warming 
potential represents the combined effect of the differing times these gases remain in the atmosphere and 
their relative effectiveness in causing radiative forcing.
Greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol: The six greenhouse gases listed in Annex A to the 
Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO
2
); methane (CH
4
); nitrous oxide (N
2
O); hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs); 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs); and sulphur hexafluoride (SF
6
)1.
Integrated assessment models: Models that seek to combine knowledge from multiple disciplines in 
the form of equations and/or algorithms in order to explore complex environmental problems. As such, 
they describe the full chain of climate change, from production of greenhouse gases to atmospheric 
responses. This necessarily includes relevant links and feedbacks between socio-economic and bio-
physical processes.
International cooperative initiatives: Initiatives outside of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change aimed at reducing emissions of climate forcers by, for example, promoting actions 
that are less greenhouse gas intensive, compared to prevailing alternatives. Cooperative initiatives also 
involve national and sub-national partners (they are often referred to as, simply, ‘cooperative initiatives’).
Kyoto Protocol: A protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change that contains 
legally binding commitments, in addition to those included in the UNFCCC. Countries included in Annex B 
of the Protocol (most Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries and countries 
with economies in transition) agreed to reduce their anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride) by at 
least five per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008–2012.
____________________
1 Nitrogen trifluoride (NF
3
) is not included as it applies only from the beginning of the second commitment period.
Glossary
vii
EMISSIONS GAP REPORT   A UNEP Synthesis
Later-action scenarios: Climate change mitigation scenarios in which emission levels in the near term, 
typically up to 2020 or 2030, are higher than those in the corresponding least-cost scenarios.
Least-cost scenarios: Climate change mitigation scenarios assuming that emission reductions start 
immediately after the model base year, typically 2010, and are distributed optimally over time, such that 
aggregate costs of reaching the climate target are minimized.
Lenient rules: Pledge cases with maximum Annex I land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) 
credits and surplus emissions units, and maximum impact of double counting.
Likely chance: A likelihood greater than 66 per cent. Used in this assessment to convey the probabilities 
of meeting temperature limits.
Medium chance: A likelihood of 50–66 per cent. Used in this report to convey the probabilities of meeting 
temperature limits.
Montreal Protocol: The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is an international 
treaty that was designed to reduce the production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances in 
order to reduce their abundance in the atmosphere, and thereby protect the Earth’s ozone layer.
Non-Annex I countries/parties: See Annex I countries/parties.
Pledges: For the purpose of this assessment, pledges include Annex I targets and non-Annex I actions, 
as included in Appendix I and Appendix II to the Copenhagen Accord, and subsequently revised and 
updated in some instances.
Radiative forcing: Change in the net, downward minus upward, irradiance, expressed in watt per square 
meter (W/m2), at the tropopause due to a change in an external driver of climate change, such as, for 
example, a change in the concentration of carbon dioxide or the output of the Sun. For the purposes of 
this assessment, radiative forcing is further defined as the change relative to the year 1750 and, unless 
otherwise noted, refers to a global and annual average value.
Scenario: A description of how the future may unfold based on if-then propositions. Scenarios typically 
include an initial socio-economic situation and a description of the key driving forces and future changes 
in emissions, temperature or other climate change-related variables.
Strict rules: Pledge cases in which the impact of land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) credits 
and surplus emissions units are set to zero.
Top-down model: A model that applies macroeconomic theory, econometric and/or optimisation 
techniques to aggregate economic variables. Using historical data on consumption, prices, incomes, and 
factor costs, top-down models assess demand and emissions for goods and services from main sectors, 
such as energy conversion, transportation, buildings, agriculture and industry.
Transient climate response: Measure of the temperature rise that occurs at the time of a doubling of 
carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere.
Transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions: Measure of temperature rise per unit of 
cumulative carbon emissions.
Unconditional pledges: Pledges made by countries without conditions attached.
20th–80th percentile range: Results that fall within the 20–80 per cent range of the frequency distribution 
of results in this assessment.
Glossary
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AR5 fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
BaU business-as-usual
BC black carbon
BECCS bio-energy with carbon capture and storage
CCS carbon capture and storage
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CER certified emission reduction
CFC chlorofluorocarbon
CO2e carbon dioxide equivalent
COP Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
EDGAR Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research
ERU emission reduction unit
EU-ETS European Union Emissions Trading System
FF&I fossil fuels and industry
GDP gross domestic product
GEA Global Energy Assessment
GHG greenhouse gas
Gt gigatonne
GWP global warming potential
HCFC hydrochlorofluorocarbon
HFC hydrofluorocarbon
IAM integrated assessment model
ICI international cooperative initiative
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IEA International Energy Agency
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LED Light-emitting diode
LULUCF Land use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
NGO non-governmental organisation
OC organic carbon
ODS ozone-depleting substances
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAM policies and measures
REDD+ reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
SE4ALL Sustainable Energy for All
SO2 sulphur dioxide
SOC soil organic carbon
TCR transient climate response
TCRE transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US$ United States dollar
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Foreword 
Foreword
The Fifth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, released earlier this 
year, is a sobering reminder that climate change is 
unequivocal, that it is essentially driven by human 
activity, and that it represents one of the biggest 
challenges of our time. The risks of inaction are too 
high to be ignored, and the effects of global warming 
can already be felt in many aspects of human life.
Further to the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 and the 
Cancun agreements of 2010, over 90 countries have 
made voluntary pledges and commitments toward 
cutting their emission levels. However, despite these 
and related efforts, current pledges and commitments 
are not sufficient to keep the average rise in global 
temperature below 2° Celsius, compared to pre-
industrial levels: the associated “gap” in required 
emission reductions is growing, not closing.
Over the past four years the “emissions gap” series 
published by the United Nations Environment 
Programme has analysed the size of the gap and 
has provided insights on options to close it. This 
fifth report provides an updated measure of the 
emissions gap. In addition, this year’s update of 
xi
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the analysis calculates an emissions gap relative to 
expected emission levels in 2030, in recognition of 
the growing focus that action beyond 2020 is gaining 
in international climate change negotiations. Not 
least, the report provides an assessment of the 
carbon budget that is consistent with the 2° Celsius 
temperature target.
Consistent with the findings of the 2014 assessment 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
our analysis reveals a worrisome worsening trend. 
Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will 
lead to an even warmer climate and exacerbate 
the devastating effects of climate change. Failure 
to curb climate change does not only undermine 
prosperity for millions of people, most acutely in the 
developing world: it threatens to roll back decades 
of development and to hamper the capacity of 
countries to achieve key societal goals, such as 
poverty reduction or economic growth.
Against this background, this report explores the 
multiple benefits of tried and tested development 
policies – benefits in terms of, for example, 
employment creation, economic growth, improved 
environmental quality and, not least, reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions. Unlike previous editions 
of the report, this year’s update does not focus on 
a specific sector. Instead, we illustrate the multiple 
benefits of one greenhouse gas mitigation option 
– energy efficiency improvements – across a wide 
range of sectors. Our findings show that multiple 
benefits, including climate change mitigation, can 
indeed be achieved by implementing fundamentally 
simple and well-known development policies.
The conclusions of the report are a stark reminder 
that, to meet the goals of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
consistent and decisive action is required without 
any further delay. I hope that the analysis presented 
in this fifth “emissions gap” report will help parties to 
the climate change convention negotiate positions 
that result in increased action. Everyone will gain if 
the outcome will enable more ambitious actions by 
more actors – sooner rather than later.
Foreword
Achim Steiner
UN Under Secretary General and UNEP Executive Director
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The world is moving towards a crucial new climate 
agreement in 2015, which could provide the long-
needed global plan to slow down climate change 
and enable humanity to adapt to the unavoidable 
part of a changing climate. While recognizing 
that some climate change is unavoidable, global 
leaders at the 2010 Cancun Climate Conference1 
agreed to limit global warming to 2 °C in this 
century, relative to the pre-industrial period. They 
also decided to review this limit to see if it should 
be further lowered to 1.5 °C.
Given the aim to limit global temperature, the 
critical question has now become what level of 
global emissions would make this possible? The 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
has tackled this question since 2010 by convening 
a large group of knowledgeable scientists to 
prepare the Emissions Gap reports. These reports 
have examined the gap in 2020 between emission 
levels consistent with the 2 °C limit, and levels 
expected if country pledges/commitments are 
met. In earlier reports the scientists conveyed the 
message that indeed a large gap exists, but also 
that there were many promising opportunities for 
bridging the gap.
executive summAry
1 . What is the focus of this year’s report?
The focus of this year’s update is on the 
emissions budget for staying within the 
2°C limit .
This fifth Emissions Gap report has a different focus 
from previous years. While it updates the 2020 
emissions gap analysis, it gives particular attention 
to the implications of the global carbon dioxide 
emissions budget for staying within the 2 °C limit 
beyond 2020. It does so because countries are 
giving increasing attention to where they need 
to be in 2025, 2030 and beyond. Furthermore, 
this year’s update of the report benefits from the 
findings on the emissions budget from the latest 
series of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) reports2.
As noted by the IPCC, scientists have determined 
that an increase in global temperature is 
proportional to the build-up of long-lasting 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, especially 
carbon dioxide. Based on this finding, they have 
estimated the maximum amount of carbon dioxide 
that could be emitted over time to the atmosphere 
and still stay within the 2 °C limit. This is called 
the carbon dioxide emissions budget because, if 
the world stays within this budget, it should be 
possible to stay within the 2 °C global warming 
limit. In the hypothetical case that carbon dioxide 
was the only human-made greenhouse gas, the 
IPCC estimated a total carbon dioxide budget 
____________________
1 The 16th Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
2 Another reason for changing the report’s focus is that previous reports have concentrated on findings from least-cost scenarios that begin in 2010 or earlier. 
However, these scenarios have become decreasingly useful because emissions in recent years have been consistently higher than, and thus not in line with, these 
scenarios. Second, it will be increasingly difficult to implement new large-scale emission control measures by 2020. Hence, looking beyond 2020 becomes even 
more important. Third, the move towards sustainable development goals will directly or indirectly influence climate targets, with countries likely to settle on 2025 
and 2030 as the target year for these goals.
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of about 3 670 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide 
(Gt CO
2
) for a likely chance of staying within the 2 
°C limit3. Since emissions began rapidly growing 
in the late 19th century, the world has already 
emitted around 1 900 Gt CO
2 
and so has used 
up a large part of this budget. Moreover, human 
activities also result in emissions of a variety of 
other substances that have an impact on global 
warming and these substances also reduce the 
total available budget to about 2 900 Gt CO
2
. This 
leaves less than about 1 000 Gt CO
2
 to “spend” in 
the future4. The key questions are: how can these 
emissions best be spread out over time; at what 
point in time should net carbon dioxide emissions 
fall to zero – that is, when should we become 
budget neutral in the sense that we sequester as 
much as we emit; and how much can we spend 
of the budget at different points in the future and 
still stay within the temperature limit? To tackle 
these questions this year’s Emissions Gap report 
analyses the scenarios published in the latest IPCC 
reports. It also examines the great potential for 
improving energy efficiency, which would not only 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions but also meet 
many other societal goals. Key findings from these 
analyses are presented in the following sections.
____________________
3 A likely chance denotes a greater than 66 per cent chance, as specified by the IPCC.
4 The Working Group III contribution to the IPCC AR5 reports that scenarios in its category which is consistent with limiting warming to below 2 °C have carbon 
dioxide budgets between 2011 and 2100 of about 630-1 180 Gt CO
2
. See main text.
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Figure ES .1: Carbon neutrality
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2 . What does the budget approach say about 
emission levels and their timing to meet the 
2 °C limit?
To stay within the 2 °C limit, global carbon 
neutrality will need to be achieved sometime 
between 2055 and 2070 .
Using the carbon budget approach and 
information from integrated assessment models 
it is possible to estimate when or if global carbon 
neutrality will need to be reached during the 21st 
century in order to have a likely chance of staying 
within the 2 °C limit.
Here global carbon neutrality means that annual 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions5 are net 
zero on the global scale (Figure ES.1). Net zero implies 
that some remaining carbon dioxide emissions 
could be compensated by the same amount of 
carbon dioxide uptake (negative emissions) so long 
as the net input of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere 
due to human activities is zero.
The fact that global emissions will continue to be 
larger than zero in the immediate future means 
that at some point we will exhaust the carbon 
dioxide emissions budget and annual net emissions 
will have to drop to zero to avoid exceeding the 
budget. If we do exceed the budget, then negative 
emissions will be required to stay within the 2 °C 
limit (Figure ES.1). 
Based on a subset of scenarios from the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5) scenario database6, the best 
estimate is that global carbon neutrality is reached 
between 2055 and 2070 in order to have a likely 
chance of staying within the 2 °C limit. This same 
subset of scenarios is used throughout this Summary 
for calculating emissions consistent with the 2 °C 
limit, with the exception of the calculation of the 
2020 gap, as explained in Section 5 of the Summary.
To stay within the 2 °C limit, total global 
greenhouse gas emissions need to shrink to 
net zero some time between 2080 and 2100 .
An important point about carbon neutrality is 
that it only refers to carbon dioxide emissions. 
Nonetheless, it is well known that other 
greenhouse gases also cause global temperature 
increases. Among these are methane, nitrous oxide 
and hydrofluorocarbons. Current and likely future 
emissions of these and other non-carbon dioxide 
greenhouse gases have been taken into account 
in the above estimation of when carbon neutrality 
should be reached. The next question is, when 
must total greenhouse gas emissions (carbon 
dioxide plus non-carbon dioxide)7 reach net zero 
in order to stay within the emissions budget? 
Based on additional assumptions about non-
carbon dioxide emissions8, it has been estimated 
that global total greenhouse gas emissions 
will need to reach net zero sometime between 
____________________
5  In this Summary emissions always refer to anthropogenic emissions.
6 This subset (called Least-cost 2020 scenarios in this report) consists of scenarios that begin in 2010, have a likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit, have modest 
emission reductions up to 2020, assume country pledges are fully implemented in 2020, and follow least-cost emission pathways leading to rapid reductions after 
2020. Modest here means that the pace of emission reductions up to 2020 is significantly slower than in scenarios that have a likely chance of staying within the 
2 °C limit and follow a least-cost emission pathway beginning in 2010. A least-cost emission pathway is an emissions pathway that takes advantage of lowest cost 
options for emission reductions and minimizes total costs of reduction up to 2100. These scenarios are often called delayed action or later action scenarios because 
they begin their least-cost pathway in 2020 rather than 2010. 
 This subset of scenarios is used for three main reasons. First, because actual emissions since 2010 have been higher than in other types of scenarios in the IPCC 
scenarios database, particularly those that meet the 2 oC target and have a least-cost pathway beginning in 2010 rather than 2020. (These are called Least-cost 2010 
scenarios in this report. These scenarios have lower global emissions up to 2020 than the Least-cost 2020 scenarios because they follow a least-cost pathway from 
2010 rather than 2020.) Second, because the Least-cost 2020 scenarios seem to be more in accord with current projections of emissions for 2020. Global emissions 
in 2020 under various pledge cases are estimated to be about 52–54 Gt CO
2
e. The Least-cost 2020 scenarios used here have global emissions close to this range 
(50–53 Gt CO
2
e). The Least-cost 2010 scenarios have much lower global emissions in 2020 (41–47 Gt CO
2
e). Third, the Least-cost 2020 scenarios are consistent with 
negotiations to deliver a new climate agreement, which provides a framework for higher ambition beginning in 2020. (Current negotiations aim to “further raise the 
existing level of ... action and stated ambition to bring greenhouse gas emissions down.”) For these reasons, the Least-cost 2020 scenarios are used for calculating 
emissions consistent with the 2 °C limit, with the exception of the 2020 gap, as explained in Section 5 of the Summary.
7 Total greenhouse gas emissions here and elsewhere in the report refer to the sum of the six greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol (carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorinated compounds and sulphur hexaflouride).
8 Since most scenarios assume that it will be difficult to remove 100 per cent of non-carbon dioxide emissions (for example, all of methane from agriculture) the 
scenarios assume that these residual emissions will be compensated for by net negative carbon dioxide emissions after total net zero greenhouse gas emissions 
are achieved. Under these circumstances, it is logical that first carbon neutrality is reached, and then net zero total greenhouse gas emissions.
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2080 and 2100. Although this is somewhat later 
than the timing for carbon neutrality it does not 
assume slower reductions of non-carbon dioxide 
emissions. On the contrary, non-carbon dioxide 
and carbon dioxide emissions are assumed to be 
reduced with about the same level of effort9. 
The estimates here are again based on a subset of 
scenarios that have a likely chance of staying within 
the 2 °C limit10. As in the case of carbon neutrality, 
the net part of net zero emissions means that any 
global residual emissions from society could be 
compensated by enough uptake of carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gases from the atmosphere 
(negative emissions) to make sure that the net 
input of total greenhouse gases to the atmosphere 
is zero. 
Bringing global emissions down to below the 
pledge range in 2020 allows us to postpone 
the timing of carbon neutrality and net zero 
total emissions .
An important consequence of the carbon budget 
is that the lower the annual emissions in the 
immediate future, including in the years up to 
2020, the relatively higher they can be later, and 
the longer the time we have before exhausting 
the emissions budget. This would allow us to push 
back the timing of carbon neutrality and net-zero 
total emissions. Hence taking more action now 
reduces the need for taking more extreme action 
later to stay within the 2 °C limit.
Following the budget approach, the levels of 
annual global emissions consistent with the 
2 °C limit have been estimated. Under these 
circumstances, global emissions in 2050 are 
around 55 per cent below 2010 levels . By 2030 
global emissions have already turned the 
corner and are more than 10 per cent below 
2010 levels after earlier peaking .
Countries took the important decision at the 
Durban Climate Conference11 to pursue a new 
climate agreement, expected to enter into effect in 
2020. This raises the crucial question about which 
global emission levels after 2020 are consistent 
with staying within the 2 °C limit. The estimates in 
the following table (Table ES.1) were made with 
this question in mind12.
These estimates are based on the same subset 
of scenarios from the IPCC AR5 database as used 
____________________
9 “About the same level of effort” means that both non-carbon dioxide and carbon dioxide emissions are assumed to be reduced in the scenarios if they have similar 
costs (per carbon-equivalent) of reduction. The reason for the later timing of net zero total greenhouse gas emissions is explained in Footnote 8.
10 The same scenarios described in Footnote 6.
11  The 17th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
12 Emission levels in this table are higher than those reported in the Emissions Gap report 2013. The reason is that the 2013 report used scenarios that assumed least-
cost emission pathways (with stringent reductions of global emissions) beginning in 2010. Hence, emission levels in that report for the time frame up to 2050 were 
lower than in this report. It is worth noting, that because the scenarios used in this report have higher emissions over the next few years, they also assume that a 
much higher level of negative emissions will be needed to compensate for them later in the 21st century (see Section 3 of the Summary).
Year Median                
(Gt CO
2
e)
Relative to 1990 
emissions
Relative to 2010 
emissions 
Range                 
(Gt CO
2
e)
Relative to 1990 
emissions
Relative to 2010 
emissions 
2025  47  +27%  -4% 40 to 48  +8 to +30% - 2 to -18%
2030  42  +14%  -14% 30 to 44 -19 to +19% -10 to -39%
2050  22  -40%  -55% 18 to 25 -32 to -51% - 49 to -63%
Notes: Since current emissions are 54 Gt CO
2
e and rising (see Section 4 of the Summary), substantial emission reductions will be needed 
to reach these levels.
Table ES .1:  Required greenhouse gas emission levels (Gt CO2e) for a likely chance of staying within 
the 2 °C limit
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____________________
13 These are the scenarios described in Footnote 6.
14 These are the scenarios described in Footnote 6. 
Figure ES .2: Emission levels consistent with the 2 °C target
above. They have a likely chance of staying within 
the 2 °C limit, assume pledge implementation 
in 2020, and then follow a least-cost emissions 
pathway after 202013. 
3 . What are the consequences of 
delayed action?
The consequences of postponing stringent 
emission reductions will be additional costs 
and higher risks to society .
The current pathway of global emissions is 
consistent with scenarios that assume only modest 
emission reductions up to 2020 and then stringent 
mitigation thereafter14. By postponing rigorous 
action until 2020, this pathway will save on costs of 
mitigation in the near term. But it will bring much 
higher costs and risks later on, such as: 
i: much higher rates of global emission reductions 
in the medium term; 
ii: greater lock-in of carbon-intensive infrastructure; 
iii: greater dependence on using all available 
mitigation technologies in the medium-term;
iv: greater costs of mitigation in the medium- 
and long-term, and greater risks of economic 
disruption; 
v: greater reliance on negative emissions; and 
vi: greater risks of failing to meet the 2 °C target, 
which would lead to substantially higher 
adaptation challenges and costs. 
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Delaying stringent action till 2030 will further 
aggravate these risks and reduce the likelihood 
of meeting the 2 °C target to 50 per cent or less. 
Conversely, putting greater effort into reducing 
emissions over the next few years would reduce 
all of these risks and would bring many co-benefits 
along with climate mitigation (see Section 7 of 
the Summary).
The higher the emissions level in the near 
term, the higher the level of negative 
emissions needed later in the century as 
compensation . Although scenarios routinely 
assume a substantial amount of global 
negative emissions, the feasibility of these 
assumptions still needs to be explored .
Another consequence of the current pathway of 
emissions (see Section 2 of the Summary) is that 
it implies that net negative emissions are needed 
to stay within the 2 °C limit, to compensate for 
higher emissions in 2020 and following decades. 
Theoretically, carbon uptake or net negative 
emissions could be achieved by extensive 
reforestation and forest growth, or by schemes 
that combine bioenergy use with carbon capture 
and storage15. But the feasibility of such large-scale 
schemes is still uncertain. Even though they seem 
feasible on a small scale, the question remains as to 
how much they can be scaled up without having 
unacceptable social, economic or environmental 
consequences. As noted above, the quicker 
emissions are reduced now, the less society will be 
dependent on negative emissions later.
4 . Where are we headed under business-as-
usual conditions? 
Although it is clear from the science that 
emissions soon need to peak to stay within the 
2 °C target16, global greenhouse gas emissions 
continue to rise . Without additional climate 
policies global emissions will increase hugely 
up to at least 2050 .
Since 1990, global emissions have grown by 
more than 45 per cent and were approximately 
54 Gt CO
2
e in 2012. Looking to the future, scientists 
have produced business-as-usual scenarios as 
benchmarks to see what emission levels would be 
like in the absence of additional climate policies, 
also assuming country pledges would not be 
implemented. Under these scenarios, global 
greenhouse gas emissions would rise to about 59 
Gt CO2e in 2020, 68 Gt CO2e in 2030 and 87 Gt CO2e 
in 2050. It is clear that global emissions are not 
expected to peak unless additional emission 
reduction policies are introduced.
5 . What about the 2020 emissions gap?
The 2020 gap is not becoming smaller . Country 
pledges and commitments for 2020 result in 
only a moderate reduction in global emissions 
below business-as-usual levels .
As an update of previous Emissions Gap reports, 
we have again estimated the expected level 
of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 
under five pledge cases, which cover a range of 
variants for complying with country pledges and 
commitments. The range of median estimates 
is 52–54 Gt CO
2
e, about the same as in the 2013 
report. It is 6–12 per cent above 2010 emissions of 
49 Gt CO2e and about 7–12 per cent lower than the 
business-as-usual level in 2020.
The 2020 emissions gap has been updated in this 
report. The gap in 2020 is defined as the difference 
between global emission levels consistent with 
the 2 °C target and the emission levels expected 
if country pledge cases are implemented. Global 
emissions in 2020 should not be higher than 44 
Gt CO
2
e to have a likely chance of staying within 
____________________
15 Here and elsewhere in this Summary we refer to net negative emissions, meaning that on a global level, the sum of negative emissions exceeds any residual positive 
emissions to the atmosphere. Also, these are anthropogenic negative emissions and would have to be additional to any natural uptake of greenhouse gases by the 
biosphere or oceans.
16 About 85 per cent of scenarios in the IPCC scenario database with a likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit have peak global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 
or before. 
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the 2 °C target17. However, the range of expected 
global emissions (median estimates) from the 
pledge cases is 52–54 Gt CO
2
e in 2020, as noted 
above. The gap in 2020 is therefore 8–10 Gt CO2e 
(52 minus 44 and 54 minus 44). This is of the same 
magnitude as given in the 2013 report.
For continuity, we base these estimates on the 
same kind of scenarios used in previous reports18. 
But these scenarios were computed some years 
ago and assume that a least-cost pathway with 
stringent emission reductions begins in 2010, 
whereas actual global emissions in recent years 
have been consistently higher. Hence, the 2020 
gap estimate is becoming increasingly uncertain.
Previous Emissions Gap reports pointed out that 
the potential exists to reduce emissions and 
narrow the gap in 2020, although this is becoming 
increasingly difficult as we get closer to that year. 
Nevertheless, the lower the emissions between 
now and 2020, the lower the risks caused by 
delaying emission reductions, as noted above. 
Without further action current pledges will not 
be met by a number of countries and global 
emissions could be above the top end of the 
pledge range .
Above we saw that the current implementation 
level of pledges is not adequate for bridging 
the 2020 emissions gap, but it does slow down 
the growth in emissions. A further important 
question is whether countries are on track to 
realize the pledges.
After reviewing available evidence from the G20 
(with the EU 28 taken as a group) it appears that 
five parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change – Brazil, China, 
the EU28, India and the Russian Federation – are 
on track to meet their pledges. Four parties – 
Australia, Canada, Mexico and the USA – are likely 
to require further action and/or purchased offsets 
to meet their pledges, according to government 
and independent estimates of projected national 
emissions in 2020. Conclusions are not drawn for 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia and South 
Africa because of various uncertainties, nor for 
Argentina, Turkey and Saudi Arabia because they 
have not proposed pledges.
On the global scale, this report estimates that 
emissions will rise to 55 (rounded from 54.5) Gt CO
2
e 
in 2020 if countries do not go beyond their current 
climate policies. This is above the top of the pledge 
range of 54 Gt CO
2
e (rounded median estimate). 
6 . What about the emissions gap in 2030?
The emissions gap in 2030 is estimated to be 
about 14–17 Gt CO2e but can be closed if the 
available global emissions reduction potential 
is exploited .
As countries discuss the contours of a new climate 
agreement for the period after 2020, the question 
arises whether an emissions gap will occur in 
2030. The gap in 2030 is defined as the difference 
between global emission levels consistent with the 
2 °C target versus the emissions levels expected if 
the pledge cases are extrapolated to 2030. 
This report estimates that global emissions in 2030 
consistent with having a likely chance of staying 
within the 2 °C target are about 42 Gt CO2e
19.
As for expected emissions in 2030, the range 
of the pledge cases in 2020 (52–54 Gt CO
2
e) 
was extrapolated to give median estimates of 
56–59 Gt CO
2
e in 2030.
____________________
17 This estimate is based on the subset of emission scenarios from the IPCC AR5 database (called Least-cost 2010 scenarios in this report). These are the same type of 
scenarios used in previous Emissions Gap reports to compute the 2020 emissions gap. These scenarios begin in 2010, have a likely chance of staying within the 2 °C 
limit, and follow a least-cost emissions pathway with stringent reductions (exceeding current pledges and commitments) after 2010. Least-cost emission pathway 
is defined in Footnote 6. 
18 See Footnote 17.
19 This estimate is based on the subset of emission scenarios from the IPCC AR5 database described in Footnote 6. A different subset of scenarios was used for 
estimating the 2020 gap in order to be consistent with previous reports.
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Figure ES .3: The emissions gap in 2030
Box S .1: The IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report*
The findings in this report are consistent with those of the IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report, but not identical. 
Global emission reductions by 2050. The IPCC Synthesis report states: “scenarios that are likely to maintain warming 
at below 2 oC are characterized by a 40–70 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, relative to 
2010 levels”. The numbers in this report (49–63 per cent) are consistent with the IPCC estimate. 
Timing of carbon neutrality. The IPCC Synthesis Report does not make an explicit statement about the timing of 
carbon neutrality. However, it can be inferred from Figure SPM.5a in the IPCC report that carbon neutrality is 
reached in the second half of the 21st century in scenarios of the IPCC’s lowest scenario category, in line with a 
likely chance of limiting warming to below 2 °C. This is consistent with estimates here that carbon neutrality is 
reached between 2055 and 2070 (for scenarios that begin a least-cost pathway in 2020, as described in Footnote 6.) 
Timing of net zero global greenhouse gas emissions. The IPCC Synthesis report states: “scenarios that are likely to 
maintain warming at below 2 oC are characterized by ... emissions level[s] near zero or below in 2100”. In this 
report it is estimated that global greenhouse gas emissions would reach net zero between 2080 and 2100, also 
based on scenarios that are likely to maintain warming at below 2 oC, but that specifically begin a least-cost 
pathway in 2020 (Footnote 6). 
* The Synthesis Report is available online at: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_LONGERREPORT.pdf
Median gap:
7–10
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
year
2025 2030
0
30
44
42
48
47
40
72
67
60
63
69
63
59
56
57
54
Median gap:
14–17
* Copenhagen Pledges in these scenarios were assumed to result in a range of 52 (50–53) Gt CO2e total greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. 
 This is lower than the current pledge assessment for 2020.  
Emission levels consistent with range of pledge cases 1–5
Emission levels consistent with 2 °C temperature target (starting from 2020 Copenhagen pledge levels)*
Results for the business-as-usual emission levels and emission levels consistent with 2 °C temperature targets are
expressed as median, 20    and 80    percentiles
Business-as-usual emission levels
A
nn
ua
l g
lo
ba
l t
ot
al
 g
re
en
ho
us
e 
ga
s 
em
is
si
on
s 
(G
t C
O
2e
)
th th
xxi
EMISSIONS GAP REPORT   A UNEP Synthesis
Executive Summary
The emissions gap in 2030 is therefore estimated 
to be 14–17 Gt CO
2
e (56 minus 42 and 59 minus 
42). This is equivalent to about a third of current 
global greenhouse emissions (or 26–32 per cent of 
2012 emission levels).
As a reference point, the gap in 2030 relative 
to business-as-usual emissions in that year 
(68 Gt CO
2
e) is 26 Gt CO
2
e. The good news is that 
the potential to reduce global emissions relative to 
the baseline is estimated to be 29 Gt CO
2
e, that is, 
larger than this gap. This means that it is feasible to 
close the 2030 gap and stay within the 2 °C limit.
7 . How can climate change mitigation be 
linked with actions to promote sustainable 
development?
There is a strong case for integrating 
climate change mitigation in a policy 
framework that can deliver economic 
growth, social development and climate 
and environmental protection .
Actions to mitigate climate change often have 
close synergies with policies that countries need 
for achieving domestic goals of improved energy 
access and energy security, or reduction in air 
pollution. The Sustainable Development Goals 
presented in the report of the Open Working 
Group20 underscore the many synergies between 
development goals and climate change mitigation 
goals. For example, efforts to eradicate energy 
poverty, promote universal access to cleaner 
forms of energy, and double energy efficiency, 
if fully realised, would go a long way towards 
bringing the world back to a path consistent with 
the temperature target set by the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
Linking development with climate mitigation also 
helps countries build energy efficient and low-
emissions infrastructure for the coming decades, 
and achieve deep transformational changes in the 
economy and society worldwide.
Policies and measures are being applied 
worldwide that promote both sustainable 
development and reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions .
The good news is that countries and other actors 
are already widely applying policies that are very 
beneficial to both sustainable development and 
climate mitigation. About half the countries in the 
world have national policies for promoting more 
efficient use of energy in buildings, such as heating 
and/or cooling. About half are working on raising 
the efficiency of appliances and lighting. Other 
national policies and measures are promoting 
electricity generation with renewable energy, 
reducing transport demand and shifting transport 
modes, reducing process-related emissions from 
industry, and advancing sustainable agriculture. 
Significant public and private investments are 
flowing into energy efficiency (US$ 310–360 billion 
in 2012) and renewable energy (US$ 244 billion in 
the same year).
Non-state actors such as regions, cities and 
companies are also promoting policies that 
advance both sustainable development and 
emission reductions. Some of these non-state 
actors have come together (in some cases with 
governments) to form international cooperative 
initiatives (ICIs) for pursuing specific sustainable 
development, energy, environmental and climate 
mitigation objectives. These ICIs have the potential 
to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
in support of, and potentially beyond, national 
emission reduction pledges. The interest and 
importance of these initiatives is increasing and a 
plethora of new such initiatives were proposed at 
the UN Secretary General’s Climate Summit in New 
York in September 201421.
____________________ 
20 The report is available online at: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html
21 Further details are available online at: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.html
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If climate mitigation actions already taking 
place were to be replicated and scaled up, 
they would provide a huge potential to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions .
Experience shows that countries can make rapid 
progress in climate mitigation when they integrate 
climate policy into their core development 
strategy, lay out a long-term strategic vision, and 
build wide-ranging political support for those 
changes. Scaling up the many feasible actions 
that reduce emissions and promote sustainable 
development yields a large potential for reducing 
global emissions. In 2030 this potential adds up 
to no less than 29 Gt CO
2
e. As a reference point, 
this is equivalent to nearly 60 per cent of global 
emissions in 2010.
New polices and measures based on proven 
approaches can provide the necessary 
incentives to achieve the full potential of 
climate mitigation and the associated  
short-term development benefits .
New government policies are needed to overcome 
barriers and create the right incentives for climate 
mitigation. One approach is to adjust fuel prices, 
through carbon taxes or emissions trading 
systems, so that they incorporate the costs of 
climate change and other environmental damages. 
Another is to reduce or abolish subsidies on fossil 
fuels, estimated to be more than US$ 600 billion 
annually, and thereby avoid this huge annual 
governmental expenditure. To make investments 
in low-carbon and resource-efficient assets 
attractive, risks need to be reduced, the general 
investment climate improved, financing costs 
lowered and government budget support made 
available. New policies are needed to promote the 
diffusion of innovative technologies in order to 
overcome the risk aversion of potential users, and 
other obstacles. But the transition to a low-carbon 
future may create losers in some companies and 
segments of the population. The impact of new 
policies on these groups needs to be considered 
and enterprises and society need to be given time 
to adjust to the new paradigm.
8 . How can energy efficiency help to promote 
development while contributing to emission 
reductions?
Energy efficiency has multiple social, economic 
and environmental benefits .
Past Emissions Gap reports have focused on good 
practices in different sectors and their ability to 
stimulate economic activity and development, 
while reducing emissions. Following this tradition, 
this report focuses on the vast potential to improve 
energy efficiency across many different sectors.
Globally the energy intensity between 2002 and 
2012 was estimated to have improved on average 
by 1.6 per cent annually22. Improvements in 
energy efficiency in 18 Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
over the period 2001–2011 have resulted in 
cumulative energy savings of 1 731 million tonnes 
of oil equivalent (Mtoe) – more than the equivalent 
of the total energy demand of the EU in 2011. As a 
result, energy efficiency is increasingly called the 
‘first fuel’.
Improving energy efficiency comes with substantial 
multiple benefits. Not only does it reduce or 
avoid greenhouse emissions, but it has long been 
considered a main way to increase productivity 
and sustainability, primarily through the delivery 
of energy savings. Moreover, energy efficiency 
measures can contribute to economic growth 
and social development by increasing economic 
output, employment and energy security. In 
a scenario with carbon prices of US$ 70 per 
tonne, for example, improvements in 
energy efficiency are estimated to result in a 
____________________
22 Energy intensity and energy efficiency are not exactly equivalent since energy intensity is a function of both the economic structure and energy efficiency of an 
economy. However, as is often the case, if the economic structure does not change significantly over time, then the changes in energy intensity can be used as a 
proxy for changes in energy efficiency.
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0.2–0.5 per cent increase in gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2030, relative to a baseline level23.
Improving energy efficiency also has important 
positive social impacts. It reduces, for example, 
air pollution and its public health risks: nearly 
100 000 premature deaths related to air pollution 
in six regions – Brazil, China, the EU, India, Mexico 
and the USA – could be avoided annually by 
2030 through energy efficiency measures in the 
transport, buildings and industrial sectors. In 
many cases these benefits have a higher priority 
for governments than climate change mitigation. 
Hence improving energy efficiency can be seen as 
an excellent opportunity for linking sustainable 
development with climate mitigation.
Improving energy efficiency has a high 
potential for reducing global emissions, and 
in a very cost effective way .
Between 2015 and 2030, energy efficiency 
improvements worldwide could avoid 
22–24 Gt CO
2
e (or 2.5–3.3 Gt CO
2
e annually in 2030) 
relative to a baseline scenario and assuming a 
carbon price of US$ 70 per tonne. This corresponds 
to a reduction in primary energy demand of about 
5–7 per cent over the same 15-year period and 
relative to the same baseline scenario. Improvements 
in energy efficiency represent about one-fifth of 
all cost-effective emission reduction measures 
over the same 15-year period24. Depending on the 
assumptions, estimates are higher. For example, the 
International Energy Agency reports that end-use 
fuel and electricity efficiency could save 6.8 Gt CO
2
e 
in 2030, and power generation efficiency and fossil 
fuel switching could save 0.3 Gt CO
2
e, also in 2030. 
An assessment by the German Aerospace Centre 
estimates that 13 Gt CO
2
e could be saved in 2030 
through energy efficiency improvements alone.
Many energy efficiency measures can be 
implemented with negative or very low long-term 
costs due to reduced energy bills that offset the 
sometimes higher upfront costs, compared to less 
efficient technologies, not even considering positive 
economic effects and multiple societal benefits.
There are great opportunities for improving 
the energy efficiency of heating, cooling, 
appliances and lighting in the buildings sector .
There is tremendous potential for improving 
energy efficiency in the buildings sector. Because 
of advances in materials and know-how, new 
energy efficient buildings use 60–90 per cent less 
energy than conventional buildings of a similar 
type and configuration, and are cost-effective in all 
countries and climate zones.
As compared to developed countries, the rate of 
new building construction in developing countries 
is much higher, which means that energy efficiency 
in buildings can best be achieved through 
regulations for building energy performance or 
codes for new construction. Several developing 
countries, and virtually all OECD countries, have 
some form of building code in place. Because they 
have an older building stock with a low rate of 
turnover, most developed countries also need to 
pay special attention to renovating their existing 
buildings in an energy efficient manner.
The provision of heating, cooling and hot water is 
estimated to account for roughly half the global 
energy consumption in buildings. Some cities 
are providing both thermal and electrical energy 
to buildings in a very efficient manner through 
district energy systems. Although these systems 
have been used mostly in cooler climates in the 
northern hemisphere, they are also becoming 
a popular way to cool buildings efficiently, for 
example in Dubai, Kuwait and Singapore.
Appliances and lighting also account for a 
significant amount of energy use in buildings, and 
____________________
23 These improvements correspond to a reduction in primary energy demand of nearly 10 per cent and a reduction in final energy consumption of 6–8 per cent, 
compared with a baseline scenario in 2030. 
24 These emission reduction estimates relate to abatement costs that would be economically efficient to incur in the period to 2030 (on average, worldwide) if carbon 
emissions were priced at US$ 70 per tonne over that same period.
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great progress has been made in improving their 
energy efficiency through national standards and 
labelling programmes. The number of countries 
with these programmes has grown rapidly from 
50–81 between 2004 and 2013. The two key policy 
measures used to improve energy efficiency of 
appliances and lighting include:
i:  mandating the energy performance of equipment 
through standards and regulation; and
ii:  labelling their energy performance. 
An important task is to acknowledge and tackle 
the many barriers to saving energy in buildings, 
including uneven dissemination of information, 
limited access to capital, high discount rates and 
market fragmentation. To overcome these and 
other barriers there are many successful and time-
tested policies that can be drawn upon, including 
energy and carbon taxes, energy performance 
standards and regulations, investment grants, soft 
loans, mandatory energy audits, energy efficiency 
obligations (for example, for utilities) and energy 
labelling and certification schemes.
Rather than applying standardized policies, 
the industrial sector uses a wide variety of 
country- and subsector-specific approaches to 
improve its energy efficiency .
There is substantial potential for reducing energy 
use in the industrial sector. But due to its diverse 
nature, it has proven impractical to implement 
standardized policies and measures. Most policy 
packages are very country-, subsector- and 
size-specific.
A typical approach is for governments 
to assist companies in identifying cost-
effective investments, often through 
energy audits or in-depth energy reviews. 
Governments also provide incentives for 
making these investments by reducing the 
payback time of these investments, through 
subsidies and loans; by mandating, through 
energy-saving targets and emissions trading; or by 
encouraging implementation through voluntary 
agreements and differentiated electricity pricing.
Three particularly promising policies and measures 
are worth highlighting:
i: Corporate energy saving programmes lay down 
comprehensive requirements to reduce energy 
use in the industrial sector. China has one of 
the most extensive of these programmes, the 
Top-10,000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises.
ii: Energy consumption targets are company-
specific targets for energy-intensive sectors, 
such as aluminium or cement. India’s Perform, 
Achieve and Trade, with its 478 target 
companies, is a major example.
iii: Energy performance standards are common 
for three-phase electric motors – standards 
are now mandatory in 44 countries, including 
Brazil, China, the Republic of Korea and the 
USA. Another example is that China has applied 
specific energy efficiency standards to the 
production of 39 industrial commodities.
Improving energy efficiency in the transport 
sector can slow down growing fuel 
consumption . Effective policies are available 
to make that happen .
Worldwide, more than half of oil consumption 
is for transport; three-quarters of transport 
energy is consumed on roads. Without strong new 
policies, fuel use for road transport is projected 
to double between 2010 and 2050. Nevertheless, 
a huge amount of energy can be saved in the 
transport sector now and in the future through 
efficiency improvements. 
The principal means for improving energy 
efficiency in the transport sector is through 
mandatory fuel economy standards for road 
vehicles. Governments often supplement 
standards with other measures such as labelling, 
taxes and incentives, which aim to boost vehicle 
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efficiency and accelerate the market penetration 
of new efficient vehicle technologies. Vehicle 
fuel efficiency can also be increased by making 
the air conditioning, lighting and other non-
engine components of vehicles more efficient 
or by modifying driving habits, which can reduce 
average fuel use by 10 per cent or more.
An important approach to improving energy 
efficiency in the transport sector is to promote 
the use of more efficient transportation modes, 
especially by shifting from private vehicles to public 
transportation or bicycling. This shift in mode 
of transportation is being encouraged in many 
cities, especially in Europe, through local zoning 
policies that limit the use of private vehicles in 
certain areas. More broadly, land-use planning and 
management can play a critical role in reducing 
energy use related to mobility by reducing the 
need for motorized transport and enabling full 
capacity public transport.
The overall efficiency by which electricity is 
produced, transmitted and distributed can be 
greatly increased .
Great potential exists for saving energy in the 
power sector. A key factor for improving energy 
efficiency is maintaining competition through 
appropriate legislation, regulations and policies 
with respect to open access, restructuring and 
deregulation. Another important approach is to 
support the retirement of inefficient and emissions-
intensive production facilities as well as improving 
operating practices to make the production 
facilities, especially coal-based facilities, operate 
near their design heat-rate values.
Improving energy efficiency in this sector also 
involves reducing transmission and distribution 
losses which amount to an annual global economic 
loss of more than US$ 61 billion and generate 
annual greenhouse gas emissions of more 
than 700 million tonnes. One-third of network 
losses occur in transformers and as a response 
Australia, Canada, China and the USA have 
adopted energy performance standards to reduce 
these losses.
Actions to improve energy efficiency 
sometimes have a rebound effect, in that they 
might stimulate further growth in energy 
demand and thus lower the greenhouse 
emissions reductions that are aimed for .
The rebound effect, as applied to energy 
consumption, refers to the situation in which 
an efficiency improvement is counteracted by 
additional energy consumption. This could arise for 
various reasons, ranging from human behaviour 
to stimulated economic activity. The question 
arises whether some of the rebound effect can be 
viewed as an acceptable price for society to pay in 
order to get the multiple benefits described above. 
Considering the potential impact of this effect on 
the expectations of energy efficiency policies and 
measures, it is important to better understand its 
effects, and to take it into account when charting 
strategies for mitigating climate change. 
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Authors: Joseph Alcamo (University of Kassel), Daniel Puig (UNEP DTU Partnership), Joeri Rogelj (ETH 
Zurich / International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis)
The road to a pivotal new climate treaty was laid 
out in Durban at the 17th Conference of the Parties 
to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2011, where 
countries agreed to work towards a “new protocol, 
... another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome 
with legal force”. Now countries are moving along 
this road with the aim of adopting a new climate 
agreement in Paris at the 21st Conference of the 
Parties to UNFCCC, scheduled for December 2015.
Although the time to the Paris Conference is short, 
the list of issues to be decided is long. Most are 
political, but some have an important scientific 
aspect. Among these are: “will current pledges 
and commitments in 2020 be enough to stay 
within temperature targets?” and “what long-term 
emissions are consistent with a 2 oC temperature 
limit?” Since 2010 the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) has produced an annual 
Emissions Gap Report to address these and other 
science-related issues of critical importance to the 
climate change negotiations. These reports have 
shown that an emissions gap is expected in 2020 
between the level of global emissions consistent 
with the 2 oC limit and the level of ambition of 
countries. Nonetheless, they have also shown that 
the gap can be bridged through a wide range of 
policies and measures that will not only reduce 
emissions but also advance the sustainable 
development agenda.
Since the publication of the first report in 
2010, many parties to the UNFCCC and other 
stakeholders have asked for annual updates. This 
year the report not only updates the estimate of 
the emissions gap, but also has a new focus in 
response to the changing context of the climate 
Introduction
negotiations, as governments look beyond 2020. 
Moreover, previous reports have concentrated on 
findings from least-cost scenarios that begin in 
2010 or earlier. Using these, however, has become 
problematic because they do not take account 
of recent emission levels, which have been 
consistently higher than the scenarios. In preparing 
this report scientists have also been able to benefit 
from the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), which has just published 
its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5; IPCC, 2014).
The focus of this year’s report is on the implications 
of the global emissions budget for staying within 
the 2 oC limit, a concept explored in the IPCC’s 
AR5 (IPCC, 2014). As noted by the IPCC, scientists 
have found that an increase in global temperature 
is proportional to the accumulation of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases that persist in 
the atmosphere. Building on this insight the IPCC 
has assessed the maximum amount of carbon 
dioxide that could be emitted to the atmosphere 
over time while keeping global warming below 
2 oC. This is termed the “carbon dioxide emissions 
budget” because if the world manages to stay 
within it, it should be possible to stay within the 
2 oC global warming limit.
Considering a theoretical situation in which carbon 
dioxide is the only anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas, the IPCC (IPCC, 2013) estimated a maximum 
total carbon budget of 3 670 gigatonnes (Gt) of 
carbon dioxide for a “likely chance” of staying 
within the 2 oC limit1. However, since emissions 
began growing rapidly in the late 19th century, 
we have already emitted about 1 900 Gt carbon 
dioxide (IPCC, 2013). In addition, a variety of 
other substances that have an impact on global 
____________________
1  A “likely” chance denotes a greater than 66% chance, as specified by the IPCC.
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warming are also emitted and further reduce the 
remaining budget to about 2 900 Gt CO
2
, leaving 
less than about 1 000 Gt carbon dioxide to emit in 
the future2. The key questions are: how can these 
emissions be best spread out over time; by which 
year should we target to be budget-neutral, that 
is, sequester as much as we emit; and, what is the 
maximum we can emit at different points in the 
future to stay on track?
To tackle these questions, this year’s report takes 
an emissions budget approach and analyses the 
scenarios published in the latest IPCC reports. 
Estimates are presented for future years in which 
carbon neutrality and net zero total emissions need 
to be reached to stay within the 2 oC temperature 
limit3. Here global carbon neutrality means that, 
globally, anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions 
are net zero. Net zero implies that some remaining 
carbon dioxide emissions could be compensated 
by the same amount of carbon dioxide uptake 
(negative emissions), as long as the net input of 
carbon dioxide to the atmosphere due to human 
activities is zero.
The report is organised into four chapters, 
including this introduction. Chapter 2 presents an 
update of current global emissions and business-
as-usual projections, introduces the budget 
approach and presents emission levels consistent 
with temperature limits, as well as estimates of the 
timing of carbon neutrality and net zero emissions. 
Chapter 3 presents global emission projections 
under various cases of implementation of pledges 
and commitments. An update of the 2020 
emissions gap is given, as well as a first estimate of 
the 2030 gap.
While reporting on targets and gaps is useful, 
it is also important to provide guidance on 
how they can be reached or bridged. With this 
in mind, previous ‘emissions gap’ reports have 
given great attention to policies and measures 
that have the dual effect of reducing emissions 
of greenhouse gases and promoting sustainable 
development. Chapter 4 in this year’s report 
continues in this tradition and reviews a cross-
cutting approach to mitigation that has clear, 
positive impacts on development. Chapter 4 
shows that energy efficiency improvements 
not only reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
energy consumption, but also deliver multiple 
benefits, such as increased economic growth and 
job creation; improved health, by reducing air 
pollution; higher disposable income, by saving 
on energy costs; and other payoffs. Improving 
energy efficiency in combination with the many 
other mitigation approaches reviewed in previous 
reports can move the sustainable development 
agenda forward while reducing emissions and 
protecting the climate system.
As in previous editions, this year’s report has been 
put together by an international team of top 
scientists. This year 38 scientists from 22 scientific 
groups in 14 countries have contributed to 
the report.
____________________
2 Working Group III of IPCC AR5 indicated that scenarios that have a likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit have remaining carbon dioxide budgets between 
the years 2011 and 2100 of about 630 –1180 Gt CO
2
. The IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report highlights that limiting total human-induced warming to less than 2 °C relative 
to the period 1861–1880 with a probability greater than 66% would require cumulative CO
2
 emissions from all anthropogenic sources since 1870 to remain below 
about 2 900 Gt CO
2
.
3 The results in this report are fully consistent with those from the IPCC’s AR5. However, the two reports give different types of projections. This report presents 
estimates of the timing of carbon neutrality and net zero total emissions, as well as emission levels consistent with temperature targets. Meanwhile the IPCC 
report focuses on estimates of cumulative carbon dioxide emissions for the periods 2011–2050 and 2011–2100. As a result, the estimates from the two reports are 
consistent, but not identical.
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1 For consistency with reporting practices of the UNFCCC and data from the scientific literature, estimates of different greenhouse gas emissions in this report are 
weighted using Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (Schimel et al., 1996). GWPs have been regularly updated in successive 
IPCC assessment reports and in the scientific literature.
2 Updated greenhouse gas emissions estimates as shown in Figure 2.1, based on Olivier et al. (2013), JRC/PBL (2012) as described in Appendix 2-A.
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Over the past few years rapid progress has 
been made in understanding the impacts of 
greenhouse gas emissions on global warming. This 
understanding has also made it possible to better 
estimate the levels of global emissions consistent 
with global temperature increase limits, such as 
1.5 °C and 2 °C.
This chapter first reviews estimates of recent 
global emission levels and trends; then examines 
business-as-usual emission levels that would 
theoretically be reached if no further action were 
taken to reduce emissions. Finally, it presents the 
levels of emissions that are consistent with limits 
to global temperature increases.
2 .1  Current global emission 
levels
Different data sources give different estimates 
of global greenhouse gas emissions for 2010 
(JRC/PBL, 2012; Blanco et al. 2014). The IPCC’s AR5 
gives a median estimate of 49 gigatonnes of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (Gt CO
2
e; 49±4.5 range, with a 
5–95 per cent confidence interval)1. A recent update 
of trends in global emission levels (Figure 2.1) gives 
a median estimate of 51 Gt CO
2
e2. In this report 
(specifically, in Chapters 2 and 3) the AR5 value of 
49 Gt CO
2
e is used.
Figure 2.1 shows emission levels by major 
economic groupings for the period 1970–2012. 
Note that, due to different methodologies and 
data sources, these values may differ from data 
derived from national inventory submissions and 
communications. The general regional trends over 
recent years were described in last year’s report. 
For 2010–2012, these preliminary estimates 
indicate that global emissions grew by an average 
of 3 per cent per year, to 53 and 54 Gt CO
2
e in 2011 
and 2012, respectively (JRC/PBL, 2012; Olivier et 
al., 2013; Appendix 2-A). Trends varied from an 
increase of 6 per cent in the G20 countries that are 
not members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), to a decline 
of 1 and 2 per cent, respectively, in OECD Europe 
and OECD North America. Over the last decade, 
per person emissions also increased in non-OECD 
G20 countries and decreased in OECD Europe and 
OECD North America.
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Figure 2 .1: Trend in global greenhouse gas emissions 1970-2012 by major economic grouping. Total 
emissions (top) and per person emissions (bottom).
Notes: Data refer to the sum of emissions of all greenhouse gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol (see Footnote 6 for a listing of these 
gases). Note that emissions for 2011 and 2012 were extrapolated as described in Appendix 2-A. Data are plotted using global 
warming potential values from IPCC Second Assessment Report.
Sources: EDGAR 4.3 (JRC/PBL 2014) and GFED land-use emissions as used in AR5.
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Carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion and 
cement production is the largest contributor to 
total greenhouse gas emissions. These emissions 
grew by about 2.4 per cent per year averaged over 
2011 and 2012, and by 2.0 per cent in 20133. This 
represents a slowing of the 2.7 per cent per year 
rate of growth experienced over the preceding 
decade. At the global level, these emissions are 
fairly well estimated, within a range of ±8 per cent 
(5–95 per cent confidence interval; Andres et al., 
2012). Cumulative carbon dioxide emissions are 
also a useful indicator of climate impact and the 
most recent trends, to 2010, are reviewed in AR5 
(Blanco et al., 2014).
Methane is the second largest greenhouse gas, 
and its apparent importance has increased 
because estimates of its global warming potential 
have increased from 21 to 284. Methane’s share 
of total greenhouse gas emissions increases from 
16 per cent to 20 per cent if the higher estimate 
of GWP is used (Edenhofer et al., 2014). The 
absolute value and trends in methane emissions 
are more uncertain (around ±20 per cent) than 
estimates of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion and cement production (Blanco 
et al., 2014). This uncertainty is apparent in the 
discrepancy between emission estimates based 
on emission inventories versus atmospheric 
measurements. While global (anthropogenic) 
methane emission levels have been steadily 
increasing over the last three decades according to 
global emission inventories, they have been stable 
ssor decreasing based on an inversion analysis of 
methane concentration trends in the atmosphere 
(Kirschke et al., 2013). Since 2006, however, both 
ways of estimating anthropogenic methane 
emissions indicate that global emissions have 
been increasing.
2 .2  Business-as-usual 
emission levels
To track the progress of additional targeted 
climate policies, it is useful to have a reference 
point for estimating emission levels in the absence 
of additional policies. When these reference points 
are presented over a series of future years, they 
are called business-as-usual (BaU) scenarios. This 
part of the report presents BaU scenarios of global 
greenhouse gas emissions5 up to 2050.
The BaU scenarios shown here are based on an 
extrapolation of current economic, social and 
technological trends. They only take into account 
climate policies implemented up to around 
2005–20106 (i.e. recent country pledges and policies 
are not considered) and therefore serve as a reference 
point for what would happen to emissions if planned 
climate mitigation policies were not implemented.
The BaU scenarios presented here draw on a much 
larger and more diverse ensemble of scenarios 
than previously available. Since the 2013 report, 
a number of model inter-comparison projects 
have reported their findings7, on which the 
recently published AR5 drew heavily. In fact, a 
novel product of the AR5 exercise is an interactive 
scenario database containing all pathways 
that were reviewed, both BaU and greenhouse 
gas mitigation scenarios, including thorough 
explanations of their scenario designs and policy 
assumptions8. Nearly 1 200 scenarios populate 
the AR5 Database, and about 250 of these can be 
____________________ 
3 The average of estimates from JRC/PBL (2014) and Le Quéré et al. (2014).
4 This is the 10-year global warming potential (please refer to the glossary for a definition). The earlier estimate of 21 is from Schimel et al. (1996) and the new 
estimate of 28 is from the IPCC AR5 based on new physical science understanding from Myhre et al. (2013).
5 Unless otherwise noted, greenhouse gas emissions or total greenhouse gas emissions refers to the sum of the six greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto Protocol 
(CO
2
, CH
4
, N
2
O, HFCs, PFCs and SF
6
). It includes emissions from fossil fuel combustion in the energy and industry sectors, as well as from land use, land-use change 
and forestry (LULUCF).
6 Different models use different base years for their internal calibration.
7 Examples include AMPERE (Riahi et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a), EMF27 (Kriegler et al., 2014b), LIMITS (Kriegler et al., 2013; Tavoni et al., 2013), and RoSE (Luderer 
et al., 2013a).
8 The IPCC WG III AR5 Scenario Database can be accessed at: https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/AR5DB/
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considered BaU ones according to the definition 
applied here9. This section of the report focuses on 
a subset of 191 scenarios, produced by 31 different 
models that take emissions of all Kyoto gases10 into 
account and have full global and sectoral coverage.
According to this large ensemble of scenarios, 
in the absence of additional policies to reduce 
greenhouse gases, global emissions are 
projected to rise to 59 Gt CO
2
e per year (range: 
57–61 Gt CO
2
e/yr)11 by 2020. They are likely 
to continue climbing to 87 Gt CO
2
e per year 
(range: 75–92 Gt CO
2
e/yr) by 2050, equivalent 
to a 70 per cent increase relative to 2010 
(Figure 2.2). Such steep upward trajectories are 
consistent with global average temperature 
levels that are around 4 °C warmer in the year 
2100 than the period 1850–1900. The likelihood 
of staying below 2 °C warming is extremely 
small in this case (Table 6.3 of IPCC WGIII AR5).
The uncertainty ranges of the BaU emissions 
projections shown in Figure 2.2 reflect different 
interpretations of economic, social and tech-
nological trends. For example, scenarios that 
are optimistic about fossils fuels and/or are 
pessimistic about renewable or nuclear energy 
tend to have emissions near the top of the range. 
By contrast, scenarios that assume slower growth 
of the economy and/or energy demand, relative 
to economic activity, tend to have emissions at 
the lower part of the range. Although the 
differences between scenarios are fairly minor 
in the short- term (2020), they become more 
pronounced by 2030.
2 .3 Global emission levels 
linked with global warming limits
2 .3 .1 Introduction
As noted above, countries have agreed to limit 
global warming to 2 °C relative to pre-industrial 
levels, and to consider lowering that limit to 
1.5 °C (UNFCCC, 2010). Findings reported here 
and elsewhere, have made it clear that society 
must limit emissions if it is to stay within its own 
global warming limits. This raises some important 
questions which are dealt with in this section:
- What is the level of cumulative greenhouse gas 
emissions consistent with limiting warming to 
below 1.5 °C or 2 °C?
- How can this budget of cumulative emissions 
be distributed over time? Under these 
budgetary constraints, when are global carbon 
dioxide emissions expected to reach zero? And 
how does this translate into a path for total 
greenhouse gases over time?
- What are the implications of not increasing 
climate mitigation efforts significantly beyond 
their current levels? 
To address these and other questions, this 
section draws on the scenarios compiled by AR5 
grouped according to their temperature outcomes 
(Appendix 2-D)12.
____________________
9 Because the different scenarios have different base year (2010) estimates for emissions (most likely resulting from non-standardized data sources and conversion 
methodologies across models), the current analysis normalizes all 2010 emissions to the same value. An estimate of 49 Gt CO
2
e per year is used for doing this 
because that was the best available value at the time the models were running scenarios for the IPCC AR5 process. Future emissions growth in each scenario is 
then indexed to this common base-year value. The emission pathways reported in this section have all been indexed in this way. For the non-indexed emission 
pathways, including the 2010 ranges, see Appendix 2-B. It should be noted, however, that these adjustments via base-year indexing have only a small effect on 
the spread of future emissions: a variety of other factors are at play. To be sure, the indexing methodology, as applied here, leads to slight increases in emissions 
levels in 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050 relative to the raw scenario data, primarily because the majority of models/scenarios in the IPCC AR5-assessed literature use 
lower values for 2010 emissions. Note that previous studies of baseline emissions projections, for example Blanford et al. (2012), have utilized similar normalizing/
indexing methodologies to control for different base-year starting points across models.
10 For list of Kyoto gases, see Footnote 5.
11 Unless otherwise stated, all ranges in this and other sections of the report are expressed as 20th–80th percentiles.
12 The IPCC AR5 Working Group III Contribution grouped scenarios based on their resulting carbon dioxide-equivalent concentrations in 2100. This choice allows for 
a direct comparison with the four representative concentration pathways (RCPs) that were used by the other working groups of the IPCC AR5. In contrast, the main 
focus of this report is the temperature outcome of emission scenarios. Therefore, the IPCC scenarios are re-grouped based on their probabilities of limiting warming 
to below specific temperature levels. Appendix 2-D provides a detailed comparison of the results of this report and the findings of the IPCC AR5.
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Figure 2 .2: Global greenhouse gas emissions in business-as-usual scenarios 
Notes: Consistent with IPCC WG III AR5 Chapter 6, carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions are constructed using GWPs over a 
100-year time horizon derived from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (see Annex II.9.1 for the GWP values of the different 
greenhouse gases). Business-as-usual scenarios imply an absence of climate mitigation policies after the 2005–2010 period (such 
as recent country pledges and policies). Data refer to the sum of emissions of all greenhouse gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol 
(see Footnote 5 for a listing of these gases.) Historic data are derived from JRC/PBL (2012) and IEA (2012). Future projections come 
from the IPCC WG III AR5 Scenario Database and are based on estimates from a large number of models. FF&I stands for emissions 
from fossil fuels combustion in the energy and industry sectors. LULUCF stands for emissions from land use, land-use change and 
forestry. The range of business-as-usual estimates for 2020 are not the same as in Figure 3.1. This is explained in Footnote 10 in 
Chapter 3. Scenario results are shown as ranges:  20th–80th percentile spread (colored), full extremes (light box), median in bold.
2 .3 .2 Geophysical requirements for limiting 
warming to below 1 .5 °C and 2 °C
Working Group I of the IPCC (IPCC, 2013) refined 
previous estimates of the sensitivity of the climate 
system to increased greenhouse gas emissions. In 
doing so it assessed a new metric for expressing 
this sensitivity – the transient climate response 
to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE). Using 
the TCRE concept, Working Group I showed that 
global mean temperature increases are almost 
directly proportional to cumulative carbon dioxide 
emissions since the pre-industrial period. This 
leads to the important conclusion that there is a 
maximum amount of carbon dioxide emissions, or 
budget that can be discharged to the atmosphere 
over time if society wishes to stay within a 2 °C or 
other global warming limit. Both Working Group 
I and III of AR5 provide carbon dioxide emission 
budgets in line with various temperature levels 
(Box 2.1). Because carbon dioxide plays a dominant 
role in determining long-term warming, we first 
focus on carbon dioxide emissions and later on 
total greenhouse gas emissions.
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Box 2 .1: IPCC AR5 and carbon dioxide emission budgets 
Figure B.2.1 (based on Figure SPM.10 of (IPCC, 2013) illustrates how cumulative carbon dioxide emissions are 
influenced by various factors. If we hypothetically assume that carbon dioxide is the only greenhouse gas affecting 
global temperature and the response of temperature to cumulative carbon dioxide emissions is constant and 
well known, then the relationship between global warming and emissions would be represented by a straight 
line (Panel A). However, since the response is not perfectly known, it has an uncertainty range as illustrated by the 
grey areas in Panels B, C, and D. Staying below a given temperature limit with a higher probability – for example 
very likely compared to likely – implies a smaller carbon dioxide budget (Panel B). Furthermore, lowering the 
temperature limit, say, from 2 °C to 1.5 °C, also implies a smaller budget (panel C). Finally, taking into account the 
additional global warming caused by non-carbon dioxide emissions at the time when global temperature peaks 
also reduces the emissions budget, and adds additional uncertainties as expressed by the larger light-orange 
area in Panel D.
Figure B .2 .1: How the transient climate response is influenced by various factors 
Source: adapted from Knutti and Rogelj (in review). 
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within the budget of cumulative emissions (Figure 
2.3, right-hand panel, where linearly declining 
emissions become zero between 2045 and 2075). 
All in all, this means that annual emissions must 
ultimately decline, and if they are high now they 
will have to decline faster later to stay within the 
budget. Conversely, if annual emissions are lower 
at the beginning of the budget period, they can 
be somewhat higher at a later time. This, however, 
implies a trade-off between earlier and later 
mitigation costs, and between risks linked to the 
different strategies (Section 2.3.4).
At present, there is still uncertainty around the 
TCRE estimates which needs to be factored into 
discussions of future emission pathways. Here 
this uncertainty is taken into account by grouping 
scenarios according to their probability to limit 
warming to below a given temperature limit. A 
likely chance as used here denotes a greater than 66 
per cent probability (Mastrandrea et al., 2010) and 
a medium chance a probability of 50–66 per cent.
The idea of a carbon dioxide emissions budget 
implies that annual emissions at some point in 
time become zero or negative in order to stay 
As to the size of the carbon dioxide emissions budget, Working Group I of the IPCC indicated – again for the 
hypothetical case that carbon dioxide would be the only anthropogenic greenhouse gas – that there was a 
greater than 66 per cent chance that the 2 °C limit could be maintained if cumulative carbon dioxide emissions 
from around 1860–1880 to some point in the future could be held to 3 670 Gt CO
2
 or less. For a greater than 
50 per cent chance, this figure is 4 440 Gt CO
2
 and for a 33 per cent chance it is 5 760 Gt CO
2
. Taking into account 
non-carbon dioxide emissions, these budgets are smaller.
As a reference point, by year 2011 a total of 1 890 Gt CO
2
 (1 630–2 150, 95 per cent confidence range) had already 
been emitted into the atmosphere by human activities. Hence a large share of the carbon dioxide emissions 
budget for limiting global warming to 2 °C has already been used up.
IPCC Working Group III also provided information on carbon dioxide emission budgets as part of their analyses 
of mitigation scenarios (Clarke et al., 2014). For scenarios with a likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit, 
they found that cumulative carbon dioxide emissions from 2011 until 2050 are in the range of 550–1 300 Gt CO
2
 
and from 2011 until 2100 in the range of 630–1 180 Gt CO
2
. These figures are broadly consistent with the results 
from Working Group I. However, the IPCC WGIII assessment, by further exploring the uncertainty in pathways 
and including a wide range of non-carbon dioxide forcing, has consistently lowered the estimates of carbon 
dioxide emission budgets in line with 2 °C as compared to those from WGI, which were based on the hypothetical 
assumption that carbon dioxide is the only anthropogenic greenhouse gas.
Finally, based on multi-model results, the IPCC Synthesis Report stated that likely limiting total human-induced 
warming (accounting for both CO
2
 and other human influences on climate) to less than 2 °C relative to the period 
1861–1880 would require total CO
2
 emissions from all anthropogenic sources since 1870 to be limited to about 
2 900 Gt CO
2
 when accounting for non-CO
2
 forcing as in the RCP2.6 scenario, with a range of 2 550–3 150 Gt CO
2
 
arising from variations in non-CO
2
 climate drivers. About 1 900 (1 650 to 2 150, 90 per cent range) Gt CO
2
 were 
emitted by 2011, leaving about 1 000 Gt CO
2 
to be consistent with the 2°C objective.
Importantly, some non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases such as methane and tropospheric ozone have a much 
shorter residence time in the atmosphere than carbon dioxide or nitrous oxide, and are therefore sometimes 
called short-lived climate pollutants/forcers. Because of their shorter time in the atmosphere, the annual 
emissions of these substances have a bigger impact on temperature than their cumulative emissions (Solomon 
et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2012).
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Over a longer period of time the carbon dioxide 
emissions budget cannot be exhausted if the goal 
is to stay within a particular temperature limit. 
It can be temporarily exhausted but then the 
accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
must be compensated by net negative carbon 
dioxide emissions – emissions that are actively 
removed from the atmosphere and sequestered. 
Note, the feasibility of achieving global negative 
emissions is uncertain and associated with a host 
of other risks (Fuss et al., 2014).
The left-hand panels of Figure 2.3 illustrate the 
temporal trade-offs in carbon dioxide emission 
mitigation. In all three examples emissions decline 
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Figure 2 .3: Illustration of carbon dioxide emission budgets in line with limiting warming to 2°C
The left hand panels show three conceptual examples that distribute the remaining emissions budget over the 21st century. 
Note that while Example C requires net negative global emissions to stay within the budget, scenarios in the other examples 
might also make use of negative emissions to a lesser extent if it helps facilitate the required emissions reductions. The examples 
are explained in the text. The right hand panel shows annual carbon dioxide emissions (black line) over time from Le Quéré et 
al. (2013). The coloured areas under the curves show the cumulative carbon dioxide emissions from 2010 onwards. The purple-
coloured area denotes cumulative carbon dioxide emissions with a likely (66 per cent) chance of limiting warming to below 
2 °C, including uncertainty. In this report, these cumulative emissions are called the carbon dioxide emissions budget. The grey-
coloured area denotes the cumulative carbon dioxide emissions projected under business-as-usual scenarios which assume no 
climate policies (likewise including uncertainty). The grey area, cumulative emissions under business-as-usual, is clearly larger 
than the blue area, the carbon dioxide emissions budget for staying within 2 °C. Cumulative emissions are taken from the WGIII 
assessment of the IPCC AR5 (Clarke et al., 2014). 
significantly during the first half of this century, 
but with important variations. In Example B, action 
is taken early to reduce emissions, which means 
that emissions are lower in the first period as 
compared to Example A. Since the carbon dioxide 
emissions budget is not used up as quickly in 
Example B, it has higher emissions in the second 
half of the century than Example A. Meanwhile, in 
Example C, action is delayed at the beginning of 
the period and initial emissions are higher than 
in Examples A or B. To stay within the carbon 
dioxide emissions budget, Example C requires 
sharp emission reductions immediately afterwards 
and net negative emissions in the second half of 
this century.
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____________________
13 Hosted at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and available at: https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/AR5DB/
14 These are cost optimal scenarios in that they take advantage of the lowest cost mitigation options available.
These and other trade-offs related to staying 
within the emissions budget are discussed in 
Section 2.3.4.
2 .3 .3 Carbon dioxide emissions budgets, 
greenhouse gas emissions and 
temperature limits
We have seen above that it is necessary to stay 
within a specific carbon dioxide emissions budget 
to keep warming below 2 °C or some other global 
warming limit. How then can these budgets be 
spread out over time? To answer this question, 
the following sections examine scenarios from 
integrated assessment models. These models take 
into account changes in the energy system and 
other important societal processes, and therefore 
help identify economically and technologically 
feasible emission reduction rates and emission 
pathways. The scenarios are taken from the IPCC 
WGIII AR5 scenario database13 (Box 2.2).
As mentioned above, science has convincingly 
established the proportional relationship between 
global temperature increases and cumulative 
carbon dioxide emissions. Hence we first focus 
on carbon dioxide emissions and then report 
findings on carbon dioxide plus non-carbon 
dioxide emissions.
The discussion of carbon dioxide emission budgets 
is structured according to two dimensions. The first 
divides scenarios according to the year in which 
concerted emission reductions14 begin – either 
2010 or 2020:
- Least-cost 2010 scenarios: the scenarios in 
this subset are of the same kind analysed in 
previous gap reports. These are scenarios with a 
likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit and 
that follow a least-cost emissions pathway with 
stringent reductions after 2010. A least-cost 
emission pathway is one that takes advantage of 
lowest cost options for emission reductions and 
minimizes total costs of reduction up to 2100.
- Least-cost 2020 scenarios: this subset of 
scenarios also has a likely chance of staying 
within the 2 °C limit. But they depart from the 
least-cost 2010 scenarios by assuming that 
emission reductions are only modest up to 
2020, that pledges are fully implemented in 
2020, and that a least-cost emissions pathway 
with rapid reductions is only followed after 
2020.  These are often called delayed action 
or later action scenarios because they begin 
their least-cost pathway in 2020 rather than 
2010. (Modest here means that the speed of 
emission reductions up to 2020 is significantly 
slower than in the least-cost 2010 scenarios, 
and emissions actually increase until 2020).
It is important to note that the current pathway of 
global emissions is so far more consistent with the 
least-cost 2020 scenarios than the least-cost 2010 
scenarios. First of all, emissions in recent years have 
been higher than in the least-cost 2010 scenarios 
(Friedlingstein et al., 2014). Second, the least-
cost 2020 scenarios seem to be more in 
accord with current projections of emissions for 
2020.  Global emissions in 2020 are projected 
to be 52–54 Gt CO
2
e under various pledge cases 
(Chapter 3). Least- cost 2020 scenarios are close to 
this range with 50–53 Gt CO
2
e in 2020, while least-
cost 2010 scenarios are much lower with a range of 
41-47 Gt CO
2
e in 2020. 
The second dimension by which the discussion is 
structured divides scenarios according to whether 
or not they rely on net negative carbon dioxide 
emissions from the energy and industrial sectors 
in order to stay within the emissions budget. 
As noted earlier, net negative global emissions 
are required in some scenarios to compensate 
for having temporarily exceeded the emissions 
budget or to facilitate a peak and decline in global 
12
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Box 2 .2: Data and methodology
Findings in this report are based on an analysis of emission scenarios available in the IPCC AR5 Working Group 
III scenario database, hosted at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and available at: https://
secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/AR5DB/. We use the original data for carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel 
and industry, total carbon dioxide emissions, and total global greenhouse gas emissions, defined in this report 
as the gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol. Non-carbon dioxide gases are reported in units of billion tonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalent per year (Gt CO
2
e/yr), and are computed from the 100-year global warming potentials 
as specified by UNFCCC (2002).
Not included in the analysis is the recently added greenhouse gas, nitrogen trifluoride (NF
3
). Contributions to 
global temperature increase of the air pollutants sulphur dioxide, black carbon, organic carbon and tropospheric 
ozone with its precursors are included in the same way as in the IPCC AR5 WGIII assessment. Many air-pollutant 
species have a common source, and some cool the atmosphere while others warm it. Hence, the cooling or 
warming effect of reducing these pollutants will depend on the precise mixture that is being reduced. While 
the Copenhagen Accord pledges do not target these species, integrated assessment models provide trends of 
air-pollutant emissions consistent with the overall changes in the energy system. In the scenarios analysed in 
this chapter, air pollutants thus are assumed to change in accordance with changes in carbon dioxide emissions.
Data for determining the probability of scenarios staying within 1.5 °C and 2 °C limits were taken from the IPCC 
AR5 scenario database. These data were computed with the probabilistic carbon-cycle and climate model 
MAGICC (Meinshausen et al., 2011a; Meinshausen et al., 2011b) in a setup that closely simulates the global 
temperature response to greenhouse gas emissions of the most complex climate models (Rogelj et al., 2012). 
This setup is in line with the most recent Working Group I assessment (Jones et al., 2013) and takes into account 
recent conjectures about a lower climate sensitivity (Rogelj et al., 2014). While this approach provides a single 
consistent framework for the assessment of temperature outcomes, the probabilities reported here depend on 
this particular framework and do not take into account uncertainty about the model structure. Temperature 
increase is computed relative to the 1850–1900 period, which is referred to as pre-industrial levels.
For the analyses in this chapter, we focus on scenarios that limit warming to below 2 °C by the end of the 21st 
century; and scenarios that limit warming below 1.5 °C by the end of the 21st century. Note that scenarios that 
stay within the 2 °C limit up to 2100, but also have increasing temperatures during that year, might still exceed 
2 °C in the next century. This analysis further uses methodologies described in the literature (Rogelj et al., 2011).
warming. Also as noted above, the feasibility of 
deploying large-scale technologies for global net 
negative carbon dioxide emissions is uncertain 
(Fuss et al., 2014; Box 2.3). Hence, it is important to 
investigate if negative emissions can be avoided15.
Constraints on global carbon dioxide emissions 
for limiting warming to below 2 °C
The analysis of scenarios has led to the following 
findings:
____________________
15 It is worth noting that even some scenarios that do not achieve net negative global carbon dioxide emissions do assume that negative emissions technologies 
(such as bio-energy in combination with carbon-capture and storage (BECCS)) are used to partly offset positive emissions. Furthermore, the land-use and forestry 
sector (not accounted for in energy and industry-related carbon dioxide emissions) can also contribute to reaching global net negative carbon dioxide emissions, 
for example, through afforestation. Scenarios are grouped based on their energy and industry-related emissions only, because the main technological uncertainties 
surrounding negative emissions (related to BECCS) are reflected most in these sectors.
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1. Carbon neutrality is reached around 2065 
(range: 2055–2070) under the subset of least-
cost 2020 scenarios, which – as noted above 
– may be more consistent with the current 
pathway of emissions up to 2020 than other 
scenario subsets. Here carbon neutrality means 
that carbon dioxide emissions16 from society 
are net zero on the global scale. Net zero implies 
that any remaining carbon dioxide emissions 
are simultaneously compensated by the same 
amount of carbon dioxide uptake (negative 
emissions) so that the net input of carbon 
dioxide to the atmosphere due to human 
activities is zero.
2. Almost all scenarios in the IPCC AR5 scenario 
database with a likely chance of limiting 
warming to below 2 °C reach carbon neutrality 
at some point in the second half of this century 
(Figure 2.4, panels a–d). 
____________________
16 Carbon dioxide emissions refers to the sum of carbon dioxide emissions from energy, industry, and land use/land cover change.
3. If emissions up to 2020 would be lower than 
in the least-cost 2020 scenarios, the carbon 
dioxide emissions budget would be used up 
less quickly, and the timing of carbon neutrality 
could be postponed by about 5–15 years. Hence, 
increasing ambition over the next few years 
would postpone by several years the difficult 
challenge of reaching net zero emissions.
4. In the scenario database from the IPCC, all least-
cost 2020 scenarios assume that net negative 
carbon dioxide emissions are needed at some 
point during this century to stay within the 
2 °C limit.  These scenarios further assume that 
carbon dioxide removal technologies such as 
bio-energy with carbon capture and storage 
(BECCS) will be implemented. The uncertainty 
around these technologies is discussed in 
 Box 2.3. The scenarios also indicate that the 
higher the emissions in the near term, the 
Box 2 .3: Negative emissions
Negative carbon dioxide emissions, the active removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, can be achieved 
by several means. These include afforestation or reforestation, carbon dioxide storage in combination with 
direct-air-capture, and BECCS (Tavoni and Socolow, 2013). BECCS is a measure that is applied often in model-
based studies because of its attractive costs and high potential.
However, the viability of large-scale BECCS deployment depends on overcoming some critical barriers. Fuss et al. 
(2014) identified four: 
1: physical and resource constraints (such as water availability), including the sustainability of large-scale 
deployment relative to other land- and biomass-related needs such as food security and biodiversity 
conservation, and the presence of safe, long term storage capacity for the captured carbon dioxide; 
2: the response of natural land and ocean carbon sinks to negative emissions; 
3: the costs and financing of an untested technology; and 
4: socio-institutional barriers, such as public acceptance of large-scale carbon capture and storage and large-
scale bioenergy production (UNEP, 2012; van Vuuren et al., 2013 ), and the related deployment policies.
Furthermore, the real-world availability of bioenergy is limited by many factors which are not fully represented 
in models (Creutzig et al., 2012) and current estimates from integrated assessment models of total mitigation 
potential vary greatly, sometimes by a factor of three (Tavoni and Socolow, 2013). Importantly, integrated 
assessment models also show that stringent climate targets can be achieved without BECCS (Riahi et al., 2012), or 
with just enough BECCS such that carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industry are net zero.
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larger the negative emissions required later in 
the century to stay within the carbon dioxide 
emissions budget (Table 2.1).
5. Scenarios with higher emissions in the near 
term, least-cost 2020 scenarios, exhaust the 
carbon dioxide emissions budget more quickly 
than scenarios with lower emissions in the first 
few years of the scenario period (least-cost 2010 
scenarios). Therefore, scenarios with higher 
initial emissions must reduce their emissions 
more rapidly later to stay within the 2 °C limit 
and/or rely more strongly on negative emission 
technologies.
Data underlying these findings are provided in 
Table 2.1. Aiming for only a medium rather than 
likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit does 
not affect the above conclusions (Appendix 2-C).
To sum up, there is a trade-off between postponing 
near term emissions reductions and having to 
reduce emissions more rapidly and stringently 
later. The more that action is delayed in the near 
term and the greater the reliance on negative 
emissions later, the earlier the timing of net zero 
global total carbon dioxide emissions. 
Constraints on total greenhouse gas emissions 
for limiting warming to below 2 °C
The previous section describes the carbon dioxide 
emission budgets consistent with a 2 °C limit. 
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Figure 2 .4: Overview of global total carbon dioxide emissions (top row) and global total greenhouse gas 
emissions – the sum of emissions of all greenhouse gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol 
See Footnote 5 for a listing of these gases. The figure shows scenarios that assume limited emissions reductions until 2020 and 
least-cost emission pathways thereafter (least-cost 2020 scenarios panels a, b, e, and f ) and scenarios that assume least-cost 
emission pathways from 2010 onwards (least-cost 2010 scenarios panels c, d, g, and h). Scenarios with negative levels of global 
energy and industry-related carbon dioxide emissions are shown in panels a, c, e, and g, and without in panels b, d, f, and h. 
More details are provided in the text. For each case, the median (solid lines) and the 20th–80th percentile range (shaded areas) are 
provided. Additionally, for comparison, the range of scenarios included in Category 1 of the IPCC AR5 WGIII assessment is shown 
in light blue shaded ranges in panels e-h.
15
EMISSIONS GAP REPORT   A UNEP Synthesis Chapter 2
What emission levels will comply with temperature limits?
Table 2 .1: Overview of global cumulative carbon dioxide emissions (CO2 emission budgets) between 
2015 and 2100 consistent with scenarios having a likely chance of limiting global temperature 
increase to 2 °C during the 21st century
“Likely” chance
(>66%)
Global carbon dioxide emissions budgets (Gt CO2)
Limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards
Scenarios relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 19 
Year of annual net global CO
2
 (including LULUCF) emissions becoming zero*: 
2065 (2055-2070) 
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050**: 4 .6 (3 .4-6 .1) per cent per year
Time window 2015–2025 2025–2050 2050–2075 2075–2100
20th percentile 358 396 -80 -325
median 370 506 48 -299
80th percentile*** 391 578 98 -148
Scenarios NOT relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 0 (none) 
Year of annual net global CO
2
 (including LULUCF) emissions becoming zero*: no data
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050**: no data
Time window 2015–2025 2025–2050 2050–2075 2075–2100
20th percentile No data No data No data No data
median No data No data No data No data
80th percentile*** No data No data No data No data
Optimal mitigation from 2010 onwards
Scenarios relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 58 
Year of annual net global CO
2
 (including LULUCF) emissions becoming zero*: 2070 (2060-
2075)
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050**: 3 .1 (2 .5-4 .0) per cent per year
Time window 2015–2025 2025–2050 2050–2075 2075–2100
20th percentile 296 455 -23 -259
median 340 542 110 -156
80th percentile*** 351 607 157 -85
Scenarios NOT relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 23 
Year of annual net global CO
2
 (including LULUCF) emissions becoming zero*: 2080 (2075-
2095)
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050**: 3 .3 (3 .0-3 .6) per cent per year
Time window 2015–2025 2025–2050 2050–2075 2075–2100
20th percentile 290 427 111 -95
median 312 506 142 -51
80th percentile*** 324 533 159  19
*  Rounded to nearest 5 years. Format: median (20th percentile – 80th percentile).
**  Reduction rates are computed as compound annual growth rates.
*** As higher emissions in the near term have to be compensated by deeper reductions later, emitting 80th percentile budgets over the entire 
century would not result in a likely chance of limiting warming to below 2°C. 
Notes: Data refers to global total (energy, industry and LULUCF) carbon dioxide emissions. For results consistent with a “medium” 
(50–66 per cent) chance, see Appendix 2-C. A comparison of these results with IPCC AR5 WGIII data is provided in Appendix 2-D.
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Table 2 .2: Overview of global emissions of total greenhouse gases in 2020, 2025, 2030, 2050 and 
2100 consistent with scenarios with a likely (greater than 66 per cent) chance of limiting global 
temperature increase to below 2 °C during the 21st century, respectively
“Likely” chance
(>66%)
Annual emission of global total greehouse gases (Gt CO2e/yr)
Limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards
Scenarios relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 18 
Year of annual net global Kyoto-greenhouse gas emissions becoming zero†: 2085 (2080-2100) 
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050‡: 2 .8 (2 .4-3 .6) per cent per year
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 52 47 42 22 -3
range and spread** 49(50/53)55 39(40/48)50 29(30/44)44 17(18/25)29 -11(-10/0)0
Scenarios NOT relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 0 (none) 
Year of annual net global Kyoto-greenhouse gas emissions becoming zero†: no data
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050‡: no data
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* no data no data no data no data no data
range and spread** no data no data no data no data no data
Optimal mitigation from 2010 onwards
Scenarios relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 50 
Year of annual net global Kyoto-greenhouse gas emissions becoming zero†: 2095 (2090-after 2100)
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050‡: 2 .1 (1 .4-2 .6) per cent per year
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 46 43 40 24 -1
range and spread** 22(41/47)49 23(38/45)47 23(34/44)46 14(20/27)33 -10(-4/3)7
Scenarios NOT relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 22 
Year of annual net global Kyoto-GHG emissions becoming zero†: after 2100 (after 2100-after 2100)
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050‡: 2 .1 (1 .9-2 .4) per cent per year
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 43 39 36 23 5
range and spread** 36(41/45)48 27(37/42)44 18(32/38)41 13(20/24)25 3(4/9)13
* Rounded to the nearest 1 Gt CO
2
e/yr.
** Rounded to the nearest 1 Gt CO
2
e/yr. Format: minimum value (20th percentile/80th percentile) maximum value. 
† Rounded to nearest 5 years. Format: median (20th percentile – 80th percentile).
‡ Reduction rates are computed as compound annual growth rates.
Notes: Data refer to the sum of emissions of all greenhouse gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol (see footnote 5 for a listing of these gases). 
For results consistent with a “medium” (50–66 per cent) chance, see Appendix 2-C. A comparison of these results with IPCC AR5 WGIII data is 
provided in Appendix 2-D.
However, society produces not only carbon dioxide 
emissions but also substantial amounts of non-
carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions such as 
methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons, 
and these also make an important contribution 
____________________ 
17 See footnote 5 for a listing of these gases.
to global warming. Indeed, many of the scenarios 
from the IPCC scenario database take account of 
both carbon dioxide and the non-carbon dioxide 
gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol17. Hence, to get 
a more comprehensive picture of the emission 
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pathways consistent with climate targets we 
consider what total18 greenhouse gas emission 
pathways – carbon dioxide plus non-carbon 
dioxide – stay below the 2 °C limit. The following 
conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of total 
greenhouse gas emissions scenarios that have a 
likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit:
1. More than half of the scenarios in the IPCC AR5 
scenario database that limit warming to below 
2 °C with a likely chance reach net zero global 
total greenhouse gas emissions in the second 
half of this century.  
2. All scenarios in the subset of least-cost 2020 
scenarios, which, as noted above, may be 
more consistent with the current pathway 
of emissions up to 2020, reach net zero total 
greenhouse gas emissions some time between 
2080 and 2100, or have nearly net zero total 
greenhouse gas emissions in 210019.
3. The timing of net zero global total emissions 
does not change much for the least cost 2010 
scenarios. In that case the timing of net zero 
emissions would only be pushed back by about 
10 years. 
4. Least-cost 2010 scenarios show a median 
emissions level of 44 Gt CO
2
e per year in 2020 
(range: 41–47).
5. Least-cost 2020 scenarios show a median 
emissions level of 52 Gt CO
2
e per year in 2020 
(range: 50–53). While this figure is much higher 
than in scenarios that begin stringent emission 
reductions in 2010 – least-cost 2010 scenarios 
– it is still exceeded by the expected level of 
emissions under almost all the pledge cases 
(Chapter 3).
6.  Looking further into the future, global emissions 
decline in all scenario groupings considered. In 
the least-cost 2020 scenarios, median global 
emissions of total greenhouse gases for 2025, 
2030 and 2050 are 47, 42, and 22 Gt CO
2
e per 
year respectively (Table 2.2).
____________________ 
18 Total greenhouse gas emissions is used here to mean the global emissions of the Kyoto gases as listed in Footnote 5. 
19 Four scenarios in this subset show total greenhouse gas emissions in 2100 which are below 0.25 Gt CO
2
e per year, but still above zero.
20 For example, van Vliet et al. (2012); Rogelj et al. (2013a,b); Riahi et al. (2013); Luderer et al., (2013a,b); Kriegler et al. (2014a) and the IPCC AR5 WGIII report 
(Clarke et al., 2014).
Constraints for limiting warming to below 1 .5 °C
Working Group III of the IPCC AR5 indicated that 
only a small number of studies have identified 
feasible total greenhouse gas emission pathways 
that are consistent with staying below a 1.5 °C limit 
up to 2100 with at least a 50 per cent chance. This 
small group of studies agree that staying within 
1.5 °C requires: 
1: immediate and strong mitigation action; 
2: the rapid upscaling of the full portfolio of 
mitigation technologies; and 
3: development along a low-energy demand 
trajectory (IPCC, 2014). 
Within these studies, only a small number of 
scenarios meet the 1.5 oC target with at least a 
50 per cent chance, and have least-cost pathways 
beginning in 2010. Emission levels in one set 
of these scenarios are 37–41 Gt CO
2
e in 2020, 
27–31 Gt CO
2
e in 2030, and 13–17 Gt CO
2
e in 2050 
(Rogelj et al., 2013b). Emissions levels in another 
set are 39–43 Gt CO
2
e in 2020, 27–35 in 2030, and 
6–10 Gt CO
2
e in 2050 (Luderer et al., 2013b). 
An even smaller number of scenarios meet the 1.5 oC 
target with at least a 50 per cent chance and have 
least-cost emissions pathways beginning in 2020 
– and therefore, have higher emissions up to 2020. 
2 .3 .4 Implications of later action
As noted above, recent trends in global emissions 
imply that the world is not following a least-cost 
pathway of early mitigation action for limiting 
global temperature increase to either 1.5 °C or 2 °C 
(Friedlingstein et al., 2014). An obvious advantage 
of delaying mitigation action is that costs are not 
incurred today. On the other hand, many recent 
studies20, including the IPCC AR5, have shown 
that delaying mitigation actions will intensify 
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the challenges to limit global warming to 1.5 °C 
or 2 °C21. In general, IPCC AR5 found (with high 
confidence) that postponing further mitigation 
efforts to 2030 beyond current country pledges 
would substantially hinder the transition to lower 
long-term emissions levels and highlights that this 
postponement would narrow the range of options 
for staying within the 2 °C limit with a likely chance. 
The IPCC highlighted that many models were 
unable to produce scenarios that keep warming to 
below 2 °C with about 50 per cent chance, when 
starting from emissions in 2030 that are greater
than 55 Gt CO
2
e.
Higher near term emission levels require very 
fast medium term emission reductions
Delaying mitigation action and allowing higher 
emission levels in the near term means that faster 
emission reductions are required later to stay 
within the same carbon dioxide emissions budget. 
For example, scenarios that delay stringent action 
until 2020 (least-cost 2020 scenarios) reduce their 
carbon dioxide emissions by around 4.6 per cent 
per year22 after 2020 as compared to scenarios with 
earlier action (least-cost 2010 scenarios) which 
fall by 3.1–3.3 per cent per year during the same 
period (Table 2.1). Furthermore, the IPCC showed 
that scenarios with stringent mitigation delayed 
until 2030 required twice as rapid a reduction in 
carbon dioxide emissions after 2030 as compared 
to those that had begun stringent reductions in 
2010 – for the case of staying within the 2 °C limit 
(IPCC, 2014). In addition, the AMPERE study found 
that scenarios with modest emission reductions 
until 2030 used up about 70 per cent of the carbon 
dioxide emissions budget consistent with the 2 °C 
limit by that date (Bertram et al., 2013; Riahi et al., 
2013). Furthermore, it was noted that immediate 
and stringent emission reductions are essential 
in scenarios that stay below the 1.5 °C limit by 
2100 (Luderer et al., 2013b; Rogelj et al., 2013a; 
IPCC, 2014).
Delay in mitigation causes lock-in of carbon 
intensive infrastructure
Scenarios with limited near term action have fewer 
options for reducing emissions if concerted action 
is delayed until after 2020 or 2030. This is because 
of carbon lock-in – the continued construction 
of high-emissions fossil-fuel infrastructure 
unconstrained by climate policies (Bertram et al., 
2013; Luderer et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013a; 
Johnson et al., 2014). Unless comprehensive and 
ambitious climate policies are put into place, the 
world will continue to expand its carbon- and 
energy-intensive infrastructure, and will not 
sufficiently incentivize the development and scale-
up of climate-friendly technologies. As an example, 
the capacity of coal-fired power plants grows by 50 
per cent by 2030, relative to current levels, under 
some later action scenarios in the AMPERE study 
(Bertram et al., 2013). 
Other studies have shown that a large fraction 
of carbon-intensive infrastructure, particularly 
coal power plants, will need to be shut down 
prematurely if the 2 °C target is to be achieved 
(Johnson et al., 2014) – an example of stranded 
assets. Delaying stringent reductions until 2030 
will result in such stranded assets in the order of 
hundreds of billions of dollars (Bertram et al., 2013; 
Johnson et al., 2014). For example, a recent study 
(Johnson et al., 2014) estimates that, over the 
period 2011−2050, global investments associated 
with stranded coal-fired power plant capacity could 
more than triple (from US$ 165 to US$ 550 billion) 
if stringent mitigation is not achieved by 2030 
(and the 2 °C target is met through later, drastic 
mitigation efforts). This happens because weak 
restrictions on emissions over the next few years 
are assumed to encourage/allow the expansion of 
conventional coal-fired power plants. As a result, a 
larger number of coal-fired power plants might be 
faced with stringent emission restrictions later and 
be forced to close before the end of their usual life. 
____________________ 
21  These paragraphs update the discussion of this topic in UNEP (2013) .
22  Emission reduction rates are typically computed as compound annual growth rates. However, such an approach cannot deal with emissions becoming negative 
at some point during the assessed time period.
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The same lock-in effect applies to lost 
opportunities for energy efficiency (Chapter 4). 
The Global Energy Assessment (GEA23; Riahi et al.,
2012) shows the critical importance of energy 
efficiency measures for limiting warming to below 
2 °C, and similar findings are valid for returning 
warming to below 1.5 °C (Luderer et al., 2013b; 
Rogelj et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b). Later-
action scenarios tend to further lock-in power 
plants, buildings and other infrastructure with low 
levels of energy efficiency. This makes the transition 
to a high-energy-efficiency future more difficult, 
and puts a greater burden on alternative emission 
reduction measures.  
Delay in mitigation can slow the 
transformation of the energy system
Recent research has shown that the share of zero- 
and low-carbon energy sources24 in the world’s 
energy economy has to substantially increase 
in order to stay within atmospheric levels of 
greenhouse gases consistent with the 2 °C limit. 
One estimate is that a 3–4-fold increase is needed 
between 2010 and 2050 (Riahi et al., 2013; IPCC, 
2014). The question is how fast this growth has 
to take place. On one hand, least-cost scenarios, 
beginning in 2010, achieve this share through a 
smooth transition and roughly a doubling of the 
low-carbon energy share every 20 years. On the 
other hand, scenarios delaying action until later 
need to achieve this objective at a much faster 
pace. For example, scenarios with delays up to 
2030, need to scale up the low-carbon share of 
the energy economy at twice the pace of least-
cost scenarios beginning in 2010 (Riahi et al., 2013; 
IPCC, 2014). Moreover, the lack of near term climate 
policies is also assumed to hinder the scaling up of 
low-emission, green-energy technologies (Eom et 
al., 2013), and hinder technological learning and 
development as well.
Early policy signals are needed to plan for 
later action
Even if near term mitigation actions are delayed, it 
is important to begin sending strong and reliable 
policy signals to industry, municipalities and 
other sectors of society that stringent emissions 
reductions will be necessary over the medium 
term – for example, laws or regulations that call 
for specific emission reductions or ceilings at some 
future date. Without clear signals, industry will 
lock-in carbon- and energy-intensive infrastructure 
as explained above.
Delay in mitigation leads to higher overall 
costs and economic challenges
Scenarios with later action have lower mitigation 
costs in the near term and this implies a lower 
burden on current economic growth but larger 
overall mitigation costs. These scenarios also have 
larger economic challenges during the transition 
towards a comprehensive climate policy regime, 
including substantial impacts on global economic 
growth and energy prices (Clarke et al., 2009; Jakob 
et al., 2012; OECD, 2012; Kriegler et al., 2014a; 
Luderer et al., 2013a; Luderer et al., 2013b; Riahi et 
al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b; 
Clarke et al., 2014). The longer the delay, the higher 
costs become. The IPCC indicates that delaying 
stringent reductions to 2030 would increase 
mitigation costs during the period 2030–2050 by 
around 40 per cent compared to scenarios without 
delays (Clarke et al., 2014). The cost penalty of later 
action depends on: 
1: when comprehensive mitigation actions finally 
begin; 
2: the magnitude of emission reductions up to 
that point; and 
3: the future availability of technologies. 
Furthermore, delaying emission reductions in the 
near term shifts the burden of mitigation costs 
____________________ 
23 The full report is available at: http://www.globalenergyassessment.org/
24 Renewables, nuclear energy, fossil fuel energy with carbon capture and storage, or biofuels with carbon capture and storage.
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to later generations (OECD, 2012; Luderer et al., 
2013b; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Clarke et al., 2014).
Finally, later-action scenarios also have higher 
economic costs, exclusive of mitigation costs, 
during the transition from modest early action to 
later more comprehensive action (Kriegler et al., 
2014a; Luderer et al., 2013a; Luderer et al., 2013b). 
These transitional costs increase strongly with 
further delay. 
Delay in mitigation reduces societal choices
The more emission reductions are delayed, the 
greater society’s dependence on future unproven 
technologies25, reducing its options and choices for 
the future (Luderer et al., 2013b; Riahi et al., 2013; 
Rogelj et al., 2013a). Many later-action scenarios 
assume that the full portfolio of mitigation options 
represented in the models is available, including 
unproven negative emissions technologies such 
as BECCS (Box 2.3). However, costs will increase if 
it turns out that anticipated technologies are not 
available, because of technology failure or because 
society chooses not to deploy them (Kriegler et al., 
2014b; Luderer et al., 2013b; Rogelj et al., 2013b; 
Clarke et al., 2014). 
Delay in mitigation leads to higher climate risks
Scenarios with later action increase the risks of 
climate impacts in the following ways: 
First, the risk of temporarily exceeding climate 
limits is higher because of higher initial emission 
levels (Clarke et al., 2009; den Elzen et al., 2010; van 
Vliet et al., 2012; Kriegler et al., 2013; Luderer et al., 
2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Schaeffer et al., 2013). 
Overshooting temperature limits, or prolonging 
the overshoot period, implies a greater risk of 
large-scale and possibly irreversible changes in 
the climate system – see Lenton et al. (2008) for 
examples of such changes. The extent to which 
such overshooting increases the risk of these 
impacts is very uncertain.
Second, the pace of temperature increase in the 
near to medium term is higher (den Elzen et al., 
2010; van Vliet et al., 2012; Schaeffer et al., 2013) 
and this can imply more rapid climate impacts and 
require quicker adaptation. For example, based 
on results from 11 integrated assessment models, 
Schaeffer et al. (2013) found that later-action 
scenarios meeting the 2 °C limit have, on average, 
a 50 per cent higher rate of decadal temperature 
increase in the 2040s compared with least-cost 
scenarios beginning in 2010 – 0.3 °C instead of 
0.2 °C per decade.
Third, postponing stringent mitigation increases 
the risk of exhausting carbon dioxide emission 
budgets. The risk comes from the fact that the 
steep reductions required to compensate for 
higher near-term emissions may not materialise. 
This may happen because of unanticipated 
technology failures (Riahi et al., 2013; Clarke et al., 
2014) or the unwillingness of future policymakers 
to take on the required high costs of mitigation.
Fourth, when action is delayed, various options to 
achieve stringent levels of climate protection are 
increasingly lost (Luderer et al., 2013b; Rogelj et al., 
2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b). One sign of this is that 
a declining number of models are able to identify 
feasible emission pathways that stay within a 1.5 °C 
or 2 °C limit with increasing delays (IPCC, 2014).
Delay in mitigation forgoes co-benefits
The IPCC AR5 WGIII report (IPCC, 2014) identified 
a large number of co-benefits of greenhouse gas 
mitigation, such as reduced costs for achieving 
air quality and energy security objectives, 
improved human health, reduced crop yield 
losses, and lower adverse impacts on ecosystems. 
Delaying mitigation action also implies that 
these co-benefits will be forgone while emissions 
remain high.____________________ 
25 As an example of technological dependency, it was found that only two out of nine models in the AMPERE study could reach a long-term 450 parts per million 
(ppm) carbon dioxide concentration target (and therefore could comply with the 2 °C target) without scaling up carbon capture and storage (Riahi et al., 2013). A 
similar dependency is found for other mitigation technologies (ibid, Rogelj et al., 2013b).
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1 At the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Doha, in 2012, a group of developed countries (Australia, Belarus, the EU and its Member States, Kazakhstan, 
Monaco, Norway, Switzerland and Ukraine) also made reduction commitments for the 2013–2020 period under the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2012b). 
2 China and India have expressed their mitigation goals in terms of emission reductions per unit of GDP; Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea, in 
terms of deviations below their respective business-as-usual emission scenarios; Antigua and Barbuda, Marshall Islands and the Republic of Moldova, in terms of 
absolute greenhouse gas emission reductions; and Costa Rica and the Maldives, in terms of a carbon neutrality goal (UNFCCC, 2013). Most of the non-economy-
wide NAMAs have not been quantified, and it is difficult to estimate their impact with much certainty. In order to approximate their impact, the following steps 
were taken. First, non-Annex I countries that have developed or are developing non-economy-wide NAMAs were identified on the basis of the UNEP and Ecofys 
NAMA databases. Second, these countries’ baseline 2020 emissions were estimated on the basis of an assumed 27 per cent growth from 2010, for a total of 
2 553 Mt CO
2
e (including LULUCF). Third, an average percentage reduction on economy-wide emissions was calculated at –19 per cent, based on the NAMAs 
of Chile, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Kenya, and Mongolia, the only countries to have quantified all their NAMAs. Finally, this reduction was applied to the 
economy-wide emissions of the countries with non-economy-wide NAMAs. If all NAMAs were completely additional to baseline emissions, this would generate a 
total impact of -482 Mt CO
2
e. However, as there is no basis to assume a high level of additionality, this impact is not included in the cases described in this chapter.
National greenhouse gas reduction pledges 
provide an important indication of the collective 
global ambition to limit greenhouse gas emissions. 
Under the UNFCCC, 42 developed country parties 
(Annex I) have submitted quantified economy-wide 
emission reduction pledges for 20201. Likewise, 
more than 55 developing country parties (non-
Annex I) have submitted nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions (NAMAs), of which 16 are framed 
in terms of expected economy-wide greenhouse 
gas emission reductions2. Together, the developed 
country parties plus the 16 developing countries 
with pledges account for about 75 per cent of 
global emissions as of 2010 (UNEP, 2013).
Since 2010, UNEP’s ‘emissions gap’ reports 
have examined whether these pledges and 
commitments are enough to stay within the 
2 °C target, or whether a gap exists between 
temperature limits and the level of ambition. 
Here we present an update of gap estimates for 
2020 and new estimates for 2025 and 2030. The 
chapter begins with an analysis of expected global 
emissions by 2020 under several cases of pledge 
implementation. Estimates from 2020 are then 
used to project 2025 and 2030 emission levels, and 
from these the 2025 and 2030 emissions gaps have 
been estimated. Finally, the chapter evaluates the 
progress of major economies in achieving their 
2020 pledges.
3 .1 How big will the emissions
gap be in 2020 and 2030?
3 .1 .1 The role of emission reduction pledges
Since the 2013 update of UNEP’s Emissions Gap 
Report, three Parties have revised or clarified their 
pledges. First, Japan has revised its pledge due 
to the Fukushima disaster and the consequent 
uncertainty regarding the future role of nuclear 
power. Japan’s tentative new 2020 target is to 
reduce emissions 3.8 per cent from 2005 levels 
(UNFCCC, 2014a). This equates to an increase of 
about 3.1 per cent from 1990 levels, as compared 
to the previous conditional target of reducing 
emissions by 25 per cent from 1990 levels. In 
addition, the Russian Federation has indicated it 
will limit its emissions to 75 per cent of 1990 levels; 
its initial pledge had promised a 15–25 per cent 
chApter 3: 
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reduction from 1990 levels (Biennial Report, 
UNFCCC, 2014a). Finally, the USA has clarified that 
its pledge to reduce emissions 17 per cent from 
2005 levels is unconditional (UNFCCC, 2014b).
Box 3 .1: Factors affecting the greenhouse gas impact of the pledges
The collective impact of the pledges on global greenhouse gas emissions will depend on: 
1:  accounting rules for credits or debits from land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), surplus emission units, and 
double counting and additionality of offsets;  and
2:  whether parties adopt the more ambitious (conditional) or less ambitious (unconditional) variant of their 
pledges. 
Accounting rules
Accounting rules govern a number of issues that affect global emissions. These rules dictate whether and how 
LULUCF and surplus emission credits can be applied towards pledges, the extent to which offsets applied 
towards pledges actually represent additional greenhouse gas reductions, and whether offsets can be double-
counted towards pledges by both buyers and sellers. Relative to a strict application of accounting rules, a 
lenient application of these rules increases global emissions by 0.7 Gt CO
2
e under unconditional pledges and by 
1.6 Gt CO
2
e under conditional pledges. This effect is slightly smaller than was estimated in 2013 (0.9 Gt CO
2
e 
and 1.9 Gt CO
2
e, respectively); we assume less non-additionality of offsets this year relative to last year due to 
improved governance of offset programmes.
LULUCF: under the Kyoto Protocol, whether Annex I parties may receive credits or debits from LULUCF activities 
depends on a set of complex accounting rules that contribute to the achievement of their pledges. However, 
except for the case of New Zealand, it is unclear if countries not part of the Protocol’s second commitment period 
will adhere to its LULUCF rules (UNFCCC, 2012a). If all Annex I countries followed the rules, the credits from 
afforestation/reforestation, deforestation and forest management activities would be 0.35 Gt CO
2
e per year, 
based on the Parties’ latest submissions3 (Grassi et al., 2012; Grassi, 2013). In other words, lenient LULUCF rules 
would push global emissions 0.35 Gt CO
2
e higher in 2020 relative to strict LULUCF rules4.
Use of surplus emissions units: accounting rules also govern the use of surplus emission units from the Kyoto 
Protocol’s first commitment periods to meet 2020 pledges. These units include assigned amount units, emission 
reduction units (ERUs) from Joint Implementation, and certified emission reductions (CERs) from the Clean 
Development Mechanism. Relative to strict accounting rules, which would prohibit the use of such surplus units 
to meet 2020 pledges, lenient rules on surplus units would increase global 2020 emissions by 0.25 Gt CO
2
e in the 
case of unconditional pledges and by 0.75 Gt CO
2
e for conditional pledges. These figures are the same as in the 
2013 update of UNEP’s Emissions Gap Report.
Double-counting and non-additionality: relative to strict accounting rules, which would prohibit double-counting 
offsets towards more than one pledge, lenient rules on double-counting would increase global 2020 emissions 
____________________ 
3 For the USA, the estimated potential contribution from LULUCF credits is about 0.15 Gt CO
2
e per year (UNEP, 2013).
4 The first ‘emissions gap’ report used a maximum value of 0.8 Gt CO
2
e, since at that time no rules had been agreed.
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by 0.3 Gt CO
2
e in the unconditional pledge case and 0.5 Gt CO
2
e in the conditional pledge case5,6. This effect is 
slightly lower than estimated in the 2013 update (UNEP, 2013), because: 
1:  Japan’s lower target leads to a lower demand for offsets; and 
2:  measures to ensure the additionality of offsets have led to a reduced estimate of the impact of non-
additionality in the lenient rules case. 
Specifically, improvements concerning the additionality of offsets include a more rigorous regulatory review, 
increased standardization for assessing baseline emissions and better oversight of third-party auditors. It is 
generally accepted that such improvements have addressed earlier concerns that offset credits did not represent 
actual or additional reductions7. Furthermore, any estimates of over-crediting must be weighed against 
countervailing factors that result in under-crediting, such as the use of conservative default factors and time-
limited crediting periods. The impact of this risk is likely to be negligible overall compared to 0.15 Gt CO
2
e in 
UNEP 2013 Emission Gap Report.
Conditionality of emission reduction pledges
Some countries have made all or part of their pledge conditional on factors such as national legislation, action 
from other countries or the provision of finance or technical support from other countries. Other countries did 
not attach conditions to their pledges. As in previous updates of UNEP’s Emissions Gap Report, these types of 
pledges are described here as conditional and unconditional pledges, respectively. Where countries have made 
only a conditional pledge, their pledge in the unconditional case is assumed in this analysis to be a zero reduction 
relative to the business-as-usual case.
3 .1 .2 Scenarios of global emissions in 2020
Assumptions of pledge cases
We present five projections of 2020 global 
emission levels, based on varying assumptions 
about accounting rules and pledge conditionality. 
The cases are as follows:
•	 Unconditional	pledges,	lenient	rules: all parties 
implement their unconditional pledges. 
(Business-as-usual is assumed for those parties 
that have only conditional pledges.) The use 
of LULUCF credits, offset double counting and 
surplus emission units is allowed.
•	 Unconditional	pledges,	strict	rules: all parties 
implement their unconditional pledges. 
(Business-as-usual is assumed for those parties 
that have only conditional pledges.) The use 
of LULUCF credits, offset double counting, and 
surplus emission units is not allowed.
•	 Conditional	 pledges,	 lenient	 rules:	 all parties 
implement their conditional pledges. The use 
of LULUCF credits, offset double counting, and 
surplus emission units is allowed.
•	 Conditional	 pledges,	 strict	 rules: all parties 
implement their conditional pledges. The use 
of LULUCF credits, offset double counting, and 
surplus emission units is not allowed.
____________________ 
5 Consistent with the analysis in the 2013 update of the report, for the pledge cases it is assumed that international emission offsets could account for 33 per cent 
of the difference between business-as-usual and pledged emission levels by 2020 for all Annex I countries, except for Canada and the USA, where no offset use is 
assumed. This is an arbitrary, conservative estimate, as many parties have yet to specify any limits to the use of transferable units.
6 This estimate is based on the offset mechanisms currently in most widespread use. If bilateral approaches to offsets proliferate, without adequately addressing 
double counting, the impact of double counting could become more pronounced.
7 For example, a recent report by the Australian Climate Change Authority (2014) found that the “CDM has detailed rules and governance arrangements to ensure 
credited emissions reductions are genuine. Its operation has improved over time, and its Executive Board has made a concerted effort to identify and address 
environmental concerns”.
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•	 Current	 pledges,	 current	 rules: all parties 
implement the pledges they are currently 
pursuing8. The use of LULUCF credits, offset 
double counting, and surplus emission units is 
allowed.
All of these cases are based on the findings from 12 
modeling groups, which have estimated national, 
regional and global emissions under conditional 
and unconditional pledges, and under different 
accounting assumptions9. Five modeling groups 
have updated their analyses, and for all modeling 
groups the updates of Japan, Russia, and the USA 
have been included. 
Assumptions of current trajectory case
This case assumes that no additional action is 
taken beyond current policies – even if it results 
in pledges not being achieved or being over-
achieved. For G20 countries, estimates are taken 
from the current trajectory, official data column 
of Table 3.1. If official data are not available, then 
estimates are taken from the current trajectory, 
independent estimates column. For other coun-
tries the business-as-usual estimates from the 
modelling groups are used. Due to a limited 
number of estimates for each country we do not 
present a range of outcomes. More information on 
the current trajectory case as it applies to the G20 
countries is given in Section 3.2. 
Scenario results
Figure 3.1 shows global emissions in 2020 for 
the pledge cases, the current trajectory case, 
business-as-usual and historical emissions. For 
the unconditional pledges, lenient rules case, the 
estimate for 2020 emissions is 54 Gt CO
2
e (range 
53–55 Gt CO
2
e) and for the conditional pledges, 
strict rules case, 52 Gt CO
2
e (range 50–53 Gt CO
2
e). 
Under current pledges, current rules, the resulting 
projected emission level is 53 Gt CO
2
e (range 
51–54 Gt  CO
2
e). For reference, the business-as-usual 
level in 2020 is 59 Gt CO
2
e (range 56–60 Gt CO
2
e).
The current trajectory case has global emissions of 
55 Gt CO
2
e (rounded from 54.5 Gt CO
2
e) in 2020, 
which is above the upper end of the range of pledge 
cases of 54 Gt CO
2
e (median and rounded estimate).
Compared to UNEP’s Emissions Gap Report 2013, 
2020 emissions under the conditional cases 
have not changed significantly. The conditional 
pledge, strict rules case has increased by about 
0.2 Gt CO
2
e due to Japan’s new tentative, less 
ambitious pledge. Under the conditional pledge, 
lenient rules case, these higher emissions are 
partly compensated by a lower impact of double 
counting relative to last year. The estimate of the 
unconditional pledge, strict rule case is 1 Gt CO
2
e 
lower than in 2013 due to the clarification that the 
USA pledge is unconditional. The unconditional 
pledge, lenient rules case is 1.2 Gt CO
2
e lower, due 
to both the revision of the USA pledge and the 
lower impact of accounting rules. The impact of 
Japan’s new pledge is limited for the unconditional 
pledge cases, as it is close to Japan’s business-as-
usual estimate that was used for the unconditional 
case in 2013.
____________________ 
8 Each country is categorized as implementing its conditional or unconditional pledge according to official documents and public statements. Conditional pledges 
are applied for Canada, Mexico and South Africa. Unconditional pledges are applied for Australia, Brazil, China, the EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, the Russian Federation, and the USA. Sources for official statements are detailed in Table 3.1.
9 These are the same groups as for UNEP (2013) and include (i) the Climate Action Tracker by Ecofys, Climate Analytics and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact 
Research–PIK, www.climateactiontracker.org (Fekete et al., 2013); (ii) Climate Interactive (C-ROADS) (Sterman et al., 2012); (iii) Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Tavoni 
et al., 2013); (iv) Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics (updated based on Stern and Taylor, 2010); (v) OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050 
(OECD, 2012); (vi) PBL Netherlands (den Elzen et al., 2013; Hof et al., 2013) and (vii) UNEP DTU Partnership (UNEP, 2014). In addition, the five model groups that 
participate in the LIMITS project (Kriegler et al., 2013): (viii) Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands, (ix) International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
(x) National Institute for Environmental Studies, (xi) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and (xii) Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. See Table B.1 in 
Appendix 4.B to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2013 (UNEP, 2013) for more information on the contributing modeling groups.
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3 .1 .3  Scenarios of global emissions in 2025 
and 2030
In this section we build on the foregoing analysis 
and present estimates of global emissions in 2025 
and 2030.
The basic approach for projecting 2025 and 2030 
emissions is to extrapolate from the low and high 
ends of the first four pledge cases in 2020. For this 
extrapolation, trends from the current policies 
scenario of the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
World Energy Outlook (WEO; IEA, 2013) are used. 
Since the WEO scenario only includes carbon 
dioxide emissions from energy use, we take the 
trends of emissions for non-carbon dioxide gases 
and emissions of carbon dioxide from industry and 
LULUCF from scenarios in the IPCC AR5 database 
that have similar 2030 carbon dioxide emissions 
as in the WEO current policies scenario. Based on 
these data a multiplier is used to extrapolate from 
2020 to 2030 emissions, and then 2025 emissions 
are interpolated.
Extrapolating from the low end of the pledge cases 
in 2020 (52 Gt CO
2
e) gives 54 Gt CO
2
e for 2025 and 
Figure 3 .1 . Annual global total emissions in 2020 under various cases
Results are expressed as median, 20th and 80th percentiles. To ensure a consistent comparison of the pathways and pledges, the 
data have been harmonized to the same 2005 emissions of 45 Gt CO
2
e, except for Grantham*. The current trajectory case does 
not have a range for reasons explained in text. The range of the business-as-usual estimate is not the same as in Figure 2.210.
* The reader is referred to Annex 4B in the 2013 update of the report for a full listing of the modelling groups involved in the scenario calculations.
____________________ 
10 The median business-as-usual estimate for 2020 in Figure 3.1 is the same as in Figure 2.2. However, the range (56–60 Gt CO
2
e) is close but not identical to that given 
in Figure 2.2 (57–61 Gt CO
2
e). The business-as-usual estimate in Figure 3.1 comes from the 12 modeling groups carrying out the pledge analyses in this chapter, 
whereas the business-as-usual estimates in Figure 2.2 are based on the IPCC AR5 scenario database in order to be consistent with the analysis of scenarios in 
Chapter 2.
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56 Gt CO
2
e for 2030. Extrapolating from the high 
end (54 Gt CO
2
e) gives 57 Gt CO
2
e and 59 Gt CO
2
e, 
respectively, for 2025 and 2030.
3 .1 .4  The emissions gap
The 2020 gap
Over the past four years, UNEP’s ‘emissions gap’ 
reports have tracked the difference between 
emission levels in 2020 consistent with staying 
within 2 °C and 1.5 °C limits, and those levels 
expected in 2020 under the pledges.  Here, we 
update this 2020 gap.  Technically speaking, the 
gap estimate is becoming highly uncertain because 
it is based on least-cost scenarios that assume 
concerted action as of 2010; these scenarios have 
become decreasingly useful because emissions in 
recent years have been consistently higher than 
in these scenarios. Recently, greater emphasis 
in the scientific literature has been given to 
delayed emission pathways consistent with the 
2 °C limit which follow a least cost emissions 
pathway beginning in 2020 rather than 2010 
(Least-cost 2020 scenarios in Chapter 2). However, 
for continuity with previous reports we present 
an update here of the 2020 gap using the same 
methodology as in previous years.
It was noted in Section 2.3.3 that the level of global 
emissions in 2020 consistent with the 2 °C limit is 
44 Gt CO2e, as in previous reports
11.
As to expected levels of emissions, we saw in 
Section 3.1.2 that the range of median emissions 
under the four pledge cases was 52–54 Gt CO
2
e 
for 2020.
Hence the emissions gap in 2020 is 8–10 Gt CO
2
e 
(that is, 52 minus 44 and 54 minus 44). This is about 
the same magnitude as estimated in the 2013 
Emissions Gap Report (8–12 Gt CO
2
e).
It is very important to note that every year between 
2014 and 2020 presents another opportunity to 
act to reduce emissions and narrow this gap – with 
important implications for the effort required by 
2025 and 2030, as discussed below. Furthermore, 
the lower the emissions over this period, the 
smaller the risks caused by delaying emission 
reductions, as articulated in Chapter 2.
The 2025 and 2030 gaps
An important issue in the run-up to a new climate 
agreement in Paris is the question of what level of 
emission reductions will be needed after 2020 to 
comply with the 2 °C limit. To address this question, 
we now estimate the emissions gap in the post-
2020 period, specifically in 2025 and 2030. The gap 
is defined in the same way as for 2020.
In Section 2.3.3 we saw that the levels of global 
emissions consistent with a likely chance of staying 
within the 2 °C limit are 47 Gt CO
2
e in 2025, and 
42 Gt CO
2
e in 2030. In contrast to the estimate of 
the 2020 gap, these estimates were based on least-
cost emission pathways beginning in 2020 rather 
than 2010.
With regards to expected emissions in 2030, 
in Section 3.1.2 we saw that the range of 
median emissions under the pledge cases were 
54–57 Gt CO
2
e for 2025. For 2030 the range was 
56–59 Gt CO
2
e.
The emissions gap for 2025 is therefore 
7–10 Gt CO
2
e (54 minus 47 and 57 minus 47). The 
emissions gap for 2030 is 14–17 Gt CO
2
e (56 minus 
42 and 59 minus 42). This is summarised in Figure 
3.2 on the following page.
____________________
11 This estimate is based on the Least-cost 2010 scenarios discussed in Section 2.3.3. This is the same type of scenario used in previous reports to compute the 2020 gap.
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Figure 3 .2: Overview of the updated gap assessment
Notes: The arrows illustrate the gaps in 2025 and 2030, which exist between median emission estimates based on the pledge 
cases (grey shading) introduced in this chapter, and scenarios limiting warming to below 2 °C with a likely chance (brown 
shading), introduced in Chapter 2.
3 .2 Progress towards pledges: 
a closer look at major economies
The current trajectories case described above 
examined the global emission levels that 
would result from current emission trajectories 
associated with currently adopted policies. 
This section examines this case in more detail, 
comparing the current emissions trajectories in 
the G20 countries12, considering the EU as a single 
party, with the trajectories associated with the 
achievement of these countries’ 2020 pledges13.
This section should be read with three important 
caveats in mind. First, not all pledges demand 
the same level of effort to implement – it is not 
necessarily the case that a country currently 
on track to achieve its pledge is doing more 
than a country not yet on track14.  Second, these 
projections are subject to the uncertainty 
associated with macroeconomic trends, such as 
____________________
12 The members of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, the USA, and the EU.
13  In 2011, these parties account for 74 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions including LULUCF, or 77 per cent excluding LULUCF (CAIT, 2014).
14 See Appendix 2.D of the 2013 update of UNEP’s Emissions Gap Report for further discussion of this issue.
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gross domestic product (GDP) and population 
growth, as well as with the impact of policies. 
Third, this analysis does not consider the potential 
use of offsets to achieve pledges; it considers only 
national emission trends.
Table 1 compares 2020 emissions under three 
cases: a pledge case, based on official data; a 
current trajectory case, based on official data; and 
a current trajectory case, based on independent 
analysis. These cases are described in Box 3.2.
____________________
15 For China, GDP is assumed to reach 61.6 trillion yuan in 2020, consistent with China’s National Communication. For India, GDP is assumed to reach 120.41 trillion 
rupees (’06–‘07 rupee value) in 2020, consistent with the average of the scenarios presented in Planning Commission (2014).  
16 The Australian official estimate is taken from DoE (2013), which, in contrast to the Biennial Report, presents a scenario without a carbon pricing mechanism, which 
reflects the current policy situation. The Mexican official estimate is based on Government of Mexico (2012), adjusted based on updated figures from the National 
Climate Change Strategy (2013).
Box 3 .2: Assumptions of analysis of progress towards pledges
For each UNFCCC party, Table 3.1 compares 2020 emissions under three cases:
1: Pledge case (official data): this case identifies the maximum amount of greenhouse gas emissions that each 
country or party could emit in 2020 and still meet its pledge – not considering the use of offsets. If a pledge 
is presented as a range, we adopted the less ambitious end as the official pledge estimate. For countries 
whose pledges are framed relative to a baseline scenario, we assume that baselines are not adjusted in the 
future. For countries whose pledges are framed as greenhouse gas intensity targets, we assume economic 
growth consistent with official projections15. Where available, we use the 2020 emissions level described by 
the country or party as the pledge level; alternatively, we calculate this level working from official base-year 
or baseline data. 
2: Current trajectory (official data): this case identifies official estimates of 2020 emissions considering projected 
economic trends and current policy approaches, including policies at least through 2012. Unless otherwise 
noted, figures are sourced from biennial reports to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2014a)16.
3: Current trajectory (independent analysis): this case similarly identifies estimates of 2020 emissions considering 
projected economic trends and current policy approaches, but is based on independent analysis rather than 
official data. Figures are drawn from the Climate Action Tracker (2013) and PBL (Roelfsema et al., 2014), as well 
as LaRovere et al. (2013) in the case of Brazil and RHG (2014) in the case of the USA. Projections considering 
only a limited subset of sectors and gases, for example carbon dioxide from fossil fuels, are omitted, as they 
cannot be compared to economy-wide projections.
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Pledge 
case
(based 
on 
official 
data)
Current 
trajectory 
(based on 
official 
data)
Current 
trajectory 
(based on 
independent 
estimates)
Recent policy developments Notes and sources
Base Year Pledges
Australia 555 685 710 
(710–710) 
New government replaced carbon-pricing 
mechanism with Emission Reduction Fund. 
This results in an increase in projected 
emissions for 2020.
Department of Environment (2013), 
Roelfsema et al. (2014).
Canada 610 735 720 
(710–735) 
Adopted greenhouse gas regulations on 
heavy-duty vehicles (GLOBE International, 
2014).
Environment Canada 2013a, 
Climate Action Tracker (2013), 
Roelfsema et al. (2014; updated), 
adjusted to include LULUCF based 
on Environment Canada 2013a. 
Official pledge estimate based 
on 2005 emissions as reported in 
Environment Canada (2013b).
European 
Union
4 500 4 370 4 185 
(4 150–4 210)
2030 framework for climate and energy 
policies proposed in January 2014; binding 
emission targets for new car and van 
fleets; regulation of fluorinated gases; 
various Member State policies. (European 
Environment Agency, 2014a)
Official pledge from EEA (2014a), 
official trajectory from EEA (2014b). 
Independent estimate from Climate 
Action Tracker (2013). Figures 
exclude LULUCF. Official trajectory 
does not fully reflect all policies 
adopted past mid-2012.
Japan 1 300 1 320 1 225 
(1 165–1 285)
Japan revised its conditional target in 
November 2013 to a less ambitious one. 
Official estimates indicate it is close, 
but not yet on track to achieve the new 
pledge with current policies, which may 
necessitate the purchase of the international 
offsets; international acceptance, quality, 
and quantity of Japan’s Joint Crediting 
Mechanism (JCM) under the UNFCCC is 
not yet clear. New pledge does not reflect 
potential reductions from nuclear power, 
which is still under consideration. Firm 
pledge will be set following further review of 
energy policy.
Biennial Report (UNFCCC, 2014a), 
Climate Action Tracker (2013), 
Roelfsema et al. (2014; updated). 
Range of independent estimates 
due to different assumptions 
regarding nuclear energy. 
Russian 
Federation
2 515 2 400 2 340 
(2 085–2 540)
With Decree 752 of Sept 2013, Russia has 
moved to a target of “not more than 75% of 
1990 levels by 2020”.
Excludes LULUCF.
United 
States of 
America
5 145 5 920 5 830 
(5 440–6 145)
The US EPA has drafted regulations to restrict 
emissions from existing power plants. 
Biennial Report (UNFCCC, 2014a), 
RHG (2014), Climate Action Tracker 
(2013), Roelfsema et al. (2014; 
updated). Figures do not include 
impact of proposed regulations of 
existing power plants. Independent 
estimate of current trajectory 
considers full range of possible 
LULUCF credit per Biennial Report 
(-898 MtCO
2
e to -614 MtCO
2
e).
Baseline Scenario Pledges
Brazil 2 070 N/A 1 640 
(1 440–1 900)
Range of independent 2020 projections has 
narrowed considerably since last report. 
Status change is due to improved estimates 
rather than new policies, though Brazil has 
continued to make progress implementing 
sectoral plans, and passed Law No. 12805 
on Establishing the National Policy on 
Farming-Livestock-Forest Integration (GLOBE 
International, 2014).
Brazilian Government (2010), 
Climate Action Tracker (2013), 
Roelfsema et al. (2014), LaRovere et 
al. 2013.
Table 3 .1 Emissions in 2020 under pledge case and current trajectory cases for 
G20 members (Mt CO2e
 )17
____________________
17 Not considering purchase or sale of offsets. Figures include all gases and sectors, including LULUCF, unless otherwise noted.
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Pledge 
case
(based 
on 
official 
data)
Current 
trajectory 
(based on 
official 
data)
Current 
trajectory 
(based on 
independent 
estimates)
Recent policy developments Notes and sources
Indonesia 2 185 N/A 1 845 
(1 175–2 520)
Indonesia has recently issued a decree 
establishing a Managing Agency for REDD+ 
and extending the forest moratorium 
(GLOBE International, 2014).
Ministry of Environment (2010), 
Climate Action Tracker (2013), 
Roelfsema et al. (2014).
Mexico 670 830 765 
(715–830)
Mexico adopted a new policy (PECC) 
covering mitigation actions for 2013–2018 
(Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2014).
Official pledge based on NCCS 
(2013); official trajectory based 
on Government of Mexico (2012), 
adjusted per SEMARNAT (2013). 
Independent trajectory considers 
Climate Action Tracker (2013) and 
Roelfsema et al. (2014). 
Republic of 
Korea
545 N/A 630 
(615–645)
Adopted road map showing how to achieve 
pledge (Climate Connect, Korea Green 
Foundation 2014).
Republic of Korea (2011), Climate 
Action Tracker (2013), Roelfsema et 
al. (2014). Figures exclude LULUCF.
South 
Africa
585 N/A 665 
(540–865)
Implementation of carbon tax (previously 
planned for 2015) pushed back to 2016 
(Bloomberg, 26 February 2014).
South Africa Department of 
Environmental Affairs (2011), 
Climate Action Tracker (2013), 
Roelfsema et al. (2014) adjusted for 
LULUCF.
Intensity Pledges*
China 14 500 N/A 14 210 
(13 345–15 800)
Comprehensive climate change law drafted; 
pilot emission trading schemes initiated in 
seven provinces and municipalities (GLOBE 
International, 2014).
Pledge case assumes 40% reduction 
in greenhouse gas intensity in 2020 
(the People’s Republic of China, 
2012). Independent estimates are 
based on Climate Action Tracker 
(2013), Roelfsema et al. (2014). The 
high end of this range is based in 
part on China’s second national 
communication (The People’s 
Republic of China, 2012) to the 
UNFCCC, which considers policies 
only through 2010, and is therefore 
likely to overestimate 2020 
emissions.
India 3 815 N/A 3 495 
(3 310–3 685)
N/A. Pledge case assumes 20 % 
reduction in greenhouse gas 
intensity per Planning Commission 
(2011), 2020 GDP per Planning 
Commission (2014), and net 
zero emissions from agricultural 
processes and LULUCF per Planning 
Commission (2011). Independent 
estimates consider Climate Action 
Tracker (2013), Roelfsema et al. 
(2014; updated). 
Other or No Pledges
Argentina N/A N/A 380 (360–400) No major developments. Climate Action Tracker (2013).
Saudi 
Arabia
N/A N/A N/A Demonstration project on carbon capture 
and storage to run in 2014 (GLOBE 
International 2014).
N/A.
Turkey   N/A N/A 505 No major developments. Roelfsema et al. (2014).
Notes:
- Numbers are rounded to nearest 5 Mt CO
2
e.
 *China and India have greenhouse gas intensity targets based on the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to GDP.  For consistency, we have 
converted these to absolute emission numbers based on the official documentation cited above, but a determination of whether each 
country has achieved its pledge should be based on intensity rather than absolute emissions.
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Based on this analysis, five of the parties 
considered here – Brazil, China, the EU28, India and 
the Russian Federation – appear to be on track to 
meet their pledges. These parties all have adopted 
new policies since putting forward their pledges 
in 2009. However, some observers have called into 
question the ambition of some of these pledges 
relative to historic trends: Russia’s 2013 pledge 
to limit 2020 emissions to 75 per cent of 1990 
levels is roughly in line with existing trends and 
scenarios (Kokorin and Korppoo 2014). Similarly, 
India’s pledge is higher than some estimates of 
business-as-usual trends (Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change, 2011; Climate Action Tracker, 
2013). Brazil’s pledge assumed a baseline in which 
LULUCF emissions would grow at the rates they 
did for 1995–2005, when in reality these emissions 
had already dropped significantly by the time the 
pledge was put forward in 2009 (SEEG, 2014).
China’s and India’s pledges are framed in terms of 
greenhouse gas intensity reductions from 2005 
levels, and several sources indicate that both 
countries are currently on track to achieve them. 
For China, the IEA Current Policies Scenario shows 
a 43 per cent reduction, and the Climate Action 
Tracker shows a 42 per cent reduction, compared 
to a pledged reduction of 40–45 per cent. For India, 
Garg et al. (2014) show that by 2012 India had 
already reduced intensity by 17 per cent out of a 
pledged reduction of 20–25 per cent by 2020, and 
the Climate Action Tracker shows India on track for 
a 36 per cent reduction by 2020.
Japan announced an adjustment to its pledge in 
November 2013 from a 25 per cent reduction from 
1990 levels to a 3.8 per cent reduction from 2005 
levels. While this adjustment makes it much easier 
for Japan to achieve its pledge, current official 
projections still place Japan’s 2020 emissions 
slightly above its pledge threshold (UNFCCC, 
2014a). Independent projections, on the other 
hand, estimate that Japan is now on track to meet 
its revised pledge (Climate Action Tracker, 2013; 
Roelfsema et al. 2014). Japan’s actual trajectory, 
however, will depend significantly on the fate of 
nuclear and coal to meet power needs.
Four parties – Australia, Canada, Mexico, and the 
USA – are likely to require further action and/or 
purchased offsets in order to meet their pledges, 
according to government and independent 
estimates. Australia had been on track to meet 
its pledge in part through its carbon pricing 
mechanism, but this mechanism was abolished on 
1 July 2014. Recent policy developments in Mexico 
(the Special Program on Climate Change (PECC) for 
2013–2018) and the USA (draft emission standards 
for existing power plants) bring each country 
nearer to meeting its pledge, but further action 
will be necessary in both cases (see, for example, 
Climate Action Tracker, 2013; RHG, 2014; World 
Resources Institute, 2014.) The USA has published 
an analysis suggesting that it will meet its pledge if 
it successfully implements the President’s Climate 
Action Plan (Executive Office of the President, 2013).
The Republic of Korea may also require further 
action to meet its pledge, but this could not 
be verified based on publicly available official 
projections. Korea did release a road map in early 
2014 outlining a pathway to achieving its 2020 
pledge (Climate Connect, 2014; Korea Green 
Foundation, 2014).
In the case of Indonesia and South Africa, 
insufficient information is currently available to 
determine whether they are on track. Official 
projections to 2020 do not reflect recently adopted 
and implemented policies, and independent 
estimates vary widely, from well below the pledge 
level to well above it.
Finally, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have 
not proposed greenhouse gas reduction pledges.
3 .3 Summing up
This chapter finds that global 2020 emissions range 
from 52 Gt CO
2
e, if all countries were to achieve their 
conditional pledges and apply strict accounting 
rules, to 54 Gt CO
2
e, if all countries were to achieve 
only their unconditional pledges and apply lenient 
accounting rules. If each country were to achieve 
the pledge it is currently pursuing – conditional for 
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some countries and unconditional for others – and 
apply the current set of accounting rules, which are 
lenient, 2020 emissions would reach 53 Gt CO
2
e. 
This is 8 per cent above 2010 emissions and 10 per 
cent below business-as-usual in 2020.
Relative to the previous update of the Emissions 
Gap Report (UNEP, 2013), this year’s unconditional 
pledge cases result in slightly lower 2020 
emissions, due primarily to the fact that the USA 
has recently clarified that its pledge should be 
considered unconditional. Revisions in accounting 
assumptions also play a minor role (the remaining 
2020 cases, and 2030 emissions, were not 
considered in the 2013 update of the Emissions 
Gap Report).
Several studies now indicate that Brazil, China, the 
EU, India, and the Russian Federation are on track 
to achieve their pledges. Conversely, Australia is no 
longer on track, due to the abolition of its carbon 
pricing mechanism. Japan is closer to achieving 
its pledge than estimated last year, but this is due 
primarily to the fact that its tentative new pledge 
is less ambitious. Japan’s 2020 emissions will 
also depend on the future of its nuclear energy 
production. Recent policy developments in Mexico 
and the USA bring them closer to achieving their 
pledges, but further efforts will be necessary. 
Likewise, further efforts are still needed in Canada. 
Available data for Indonesia and South Africa are 
inconclusive and Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and 
Turkey have not made pledges.
Finally, extrapolating trends from the pledge cases 
in 2020 out to 2030 leads to an emissions gap of 
14–17 Gt CO
2
e in 2030, which is about a third of 
current global emissions. These estimates assume 
emission pathways with delayed action until 
2020 and follow cost-optimal paths afterwards 
(Section 2.3.3).
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4 .1 Climate mitigation in a 
development context
4 .1 .1 Sustainable development and addressing 
climate change
Sustainable development continues to be an over-
riding priority for developing countries, where 
poverty is a major issue and 1.3 billion people 
still do not have access to basic energy services. 
While sustainable development is the aim, the 
reality is that another model is steering world 
development, bringing the unintended impacts 
of climate change, resource scarcity, air pollution, 
water pollution and other large-scale types of 
environmental degradation.
An alternative model of sustainable economic and 
societal development has been proposed which 
emphasizes non-polluting and resource-efficient 
management and technologies, and which would 
help decouple economic growth and an increase 
in well-being from the build-up of greenhouse 
gas emissions, the depletion of resources and 
the degradation of land. This model has been 
articulated by a range of international organi-
sations, such as UNEP in its report Towards a Green 
Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development 
and Poverty Eradication (UNEP, 2011), the African 
Development Bank in its African Development 
Report 2012: Towards Green Growth in Africa (AfDB, 
2012), the World Bank in Inclusive Green Growth: 
the Pathway to Sustainable Development (World 
Bank, 2012), and OECD in its Green Growth Strategy 
(OECD, 2011). They all make a strong case for 
integrating climate change mitigation in a policy 
framework that can deliver economic growth, 
development and stringent climate action.
Most recently Better Growth, Better Climate: The 
New Climate Economy Report from the Global 
Commission on the Economy and Climate (NCE, 
2014) made the case for a new economic model 
in relation to the urgent need to deal with climate 
change. Key messages from the report are: 
1:  countries at all levels of income can have lasting 
economic growth, while effectively dealing 
with the risks of climate change; 
2:  the next 15 years of investment in the 
world’s urban, energy and land use systems 
will determine the future climate; if climate 
 change is not tackled, economic growth itself 
will be at risk; 
3: future economic growth does not have to 
replicate the high-carbon, unevenly distributed 
model of the past: there are now enough 
efficient and low-carbon solutions available; 
4: stimulating innovation and making it attractive 
to invest in low-carbon infrastructure can drive 
a greater resource efficiency that will lead to 
economic growth, many social and environmental 
benefits, and lower emissions; and
5: additional investments needed for this 
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transformation will be modest compared to the 
basic investments needed to raise the level of 
well-being worldwide.
4 .1 .2 Sustainable development goals can 
deliver strong climate benefits
The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)1 
aim to build on economic, social and environmental 
links in achieving sustainable development. The 
proposed SDGs, to be realized by 2030, provide 
a concrete opportunity to achieve climate co-
benefits while mitigating climate risks. One of the 
proposed goals is to ensure access to affordable 
sustainable, and reliable modern energy services 
for all, building on the Sustainable Energy for All 
(SE4ALL) initiative (UN, 2012). The 2030 goals of 
the SE4ALL initiative are to: 
1:  ensure universal access to sustainable modern 
energy services for all; 
2:  double the share of renewable energy in the 
global energy mix; and 
3:  double the global rate of improvement in 
energy efficiency. 
Studies on the SE4ALL initiative (Rogelj et al., 
2013; IRENA, 2014) suggest that achieving these 
objectives could provide a major contribution to 
putting the world on an emissions pathway that 
stays within the 2 °C limit, assuming other actions 
are taken such as stopping deforestation and 
expanding sustainable agriculture. Other SDGs can 
also contribute to addressing climate change, not 
only by reducing emissions, but also by improving 
resilience against climate change impacts.
4 .1 .3 Climate change mitigation has 
multiple benefits
While the previous section argues that sustainable 
development can lead to climate mitigation, the 
reverse is also true – actions to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions yield many important benefits to 
development. Comprehensive overviews of the 
benefits of many climate policies are included 
in the IPCC’s AR5 (Clarke et al., 2014) and in 
a UNFCCC technical paper (UNFCCC, 2014). 
Table 4.1 lists these mitigation actions and 
Appendix 4-A presents a short overview of their 
economic, social, environmental and other 
benefits. These options include: introducing more 
renewable energy in the energy supply system, 
improving energy efficiency across all sectors and 
expanding sustainable agriculture and forestry. 
In Section 4.2 we look more closely at one of 
these promising options – improving energy 
efficiency – which effectively reduces emissions 
and brings multiple benefits to development. 
The overall conclusion is that actions to mitigate 
Box 4 .1: Energy and climate scenarios for India
Comparison of energy-security driven scenarios and climate-specific scenarios for India by The Energy and 
Resources Institute indicate strong convergence in the direction of changes required to achieve both energy 
security and climate change mitigation. These scenarios highlight that there are several technological options 
that could help meet the twin objectives of reducing emissions and enhancing energy access, and through 
these, support sustainable development. For example, energy efficiency often brings economic gains in addition 
to reducing energy use and emissions (Section 4.2.2). Moreover, decentralized power generation through 
renewables could lead to additional benefits in the form of improved livelihoods, and better health of women 
and children, in addition to helping achieve a low carbon development path. Some of the important areas 
where clear synergies exist are improving energy efficiency, increasing the deployment of renewable energy 
technologies and increasing the efficiency of transport systems (TERI, 2009).
____________________ 
1 For details on each sustainable development goal see: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html
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climate change often have close synergies with 
policies that countries pursue to fulfil their own 
priorities; this includes domestic goals such as 
energy security, reduction in local air pollution, 
reduced congestion on roads, and improved 
access to electricity and modern fuels (Box 4.1).
An important point is that the emission reduction 
potentials of the various options in Table 4.1 add 
up to a substantial global potential for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions (about 28.5 Gt CO
2
e 
relative to a baseline in 2030). This is equivalent to 
nearly 60 per cent of the global greenhouse gas 
emissions released in 2010.
4 .1 .4 Barriers
Even though the arguments for a transformation 
to a low carbon, climate resilient and resource 
efficient economy are compelling, there will be 
trade-offs to be made and barriers to be overcome. 
The most important barriers are those that provide 
Selected thematic areas Approximate 
emission 
reductions 
potential 
(Gt CO2e)
Level of co-
benefits a
Level of barriers a Level of coverage by:
National pledges 
and policies b 
(per cent)
International 
cooperative 
initiatives c 
Energy supply – renewable energy, 
including increased energy access
5 * High Medium
50
High
Energy supply – fuel switch, combined 
heat-and-power, nuclear, carbon capture 
and storage
3 * Low High
10
Low
Energy supply: energy industry 2 ** Medium Low 10 Low
Manufacturing industry – energy efficiency
3 *
High High 30 Medium
Manufacturing industry – renewable 
energy
Medium Medium
30
Medium
Manufacturing industry – process 
emissions
1.5 ** Medium Low
10
Low
Buildings – energy efficient heating and 
cooling
2 *
High High
50
High
Buildings – renewable energy heating High Medium 30 Medium
Buildings – appliances and lighting High Medium 50 High
Transport – energy efficiency, incl. 
electrification
3 *
High Medium
20
High
Transport – renewable energy Medium Medium 50 Medium
Transport – demand reduction and modal 
shift
High Medium
10
Medium
Sustainable waste management 2 ** Low Low 30 Medium
Sustainable and efficient agriculture 3 ** Medium Medium 10 High
Sustainable forestry 4 *** Medium Medium 30 High
* “Manufacturing industry” includes also carbon capture and storage and fuel and feedstock switching (IEA, 2014a).
** Non-energy emissions are not covered by the Energy Technology Perspectives 2014 (IEA, 2014a). Therefore we used the IPCC RCP scenarios 
to derive the order of magnitude of the potential. We used the difference between a reference scenario (RCP 8.5) and a 2 °C compatible 
scenario (RCP 2.6) as a measure of potential. The analysis in the IPCC AR5 on the full IPCC scenario dataset does not include the sectoral split 
that was chosen in this report.
***  Estimates of mitigation potential from forestry are very diverse. For a simple estimate of potential we assumed that total current net 
emissions from forests (as in RCP 2.6) can be reduced to zero by 2030. The resulting emissions reduction potential estimate is in line with 
the range from the full IPCC scenario analysis of about 1 to 8 Gt CO
2
 (Figure 6.35).
a  Summary rating based on IPCC AR5, WGIII Table 6.7.
b Coverage adapted from Braun et al., 2014. Includes the 38 largest emitters, rounded to 10 per cent (100 per cent represent coverage of all 
sub-areas in one thematic area – for example, fuel economy standards in passenger and freight transport).
c Number of initiatives: counted from 197 initiatives included in: www.climateinitiativesdatabase.org.
Table 4 .1: Overview of emission reduction potential, co-benefits, barriers, and coverage by national 
actions and international cooperative initiatives
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a motivation for sticking with the current high-
carbon economic model: for example, prices that 
do not factor in damage caused by climate change, 
air pollution or other negative consequences 
of current economic practices; subsidies that 
encourage the use of fossil fuel, water and 
other scarce resources; investments that 
are driven by short-term returns in traditional 
high-carbon sectors and practices; and lack of 
investment in low-carbon, resource efficient 
solutions (NCE, 2014).
The scale of these up-front investments can be 
a real obstacle, as in the case of smaller 
manufacturing units that do not have the capital 
or the borrowing power to undertake such 
investments. In some cases the lack of appropriate 
and affordable technologies becomes an additional 
barrier. In another case, a study by the Energy and 
Resources Institute of India and the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF/TERI, 2013) examined the technical 
feasibility of a 100 per cent renewable energy 
scenario for India. The study found that although 
the country had the technical potential to 
run on renewable energy sources, significant 
technological gaps made it difficult to realize. 
Also, barriers to innovation must be overcome. The 
diffusion of innovative technologies is hampered 
by current pricing systems, risk aversion of potential 
users, regulations that favour existing products 
and lack of supporting networks – for example, 
infrastructure for electric vehicles (NCE, 2014).
In most cases a transition will also create losers 
in that some economic sectors, companies and 
segments of the population may see their business 
or incomes being affected. Hence, it is important 
to carefully consider the impact of new policies on 
these groups and to give them time to adjust.
4 .1 .5 Policies and international collaboration 
that support sustainable development and 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions
To overcome the above barriers, new government 
policies are needed to create the right incentives. 
One approach is to incorporate the costs of climate 
change into the price of fuels through carbon taxes 
or emissions trading systems. A complimentary 
approach is to reduce or abolish subsidies on 
fossil fuels and thereby avoid annual government 
expenditure of more than US$ 600 billion (IEA 2013a; 
OECD 2013). At the same time, it is important to 
provide financial assistance to poor households that 
may not be able to afford more efficient fuels 
and technologies.
The good news is that countries are already widely 
applying policies that are overcoming barriers, 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and promoting 
sustainable development. This is confirmed in 
Table 4.1 which shows that about half the countries 
in the world have national policies for promoting 
more efficient heating and/or cooling in buildings, 
and that about half are working on raising the 
efficiency of appliances and lighting. About 30 per 
cent of countries have programmes for sustainable 
waste management and sustainable forestry. 
Moreover, Bhutan, Costa Rica, Maldives, Norway 
and Sweden have carbon neutrality targets. By 
2050 Denmark aims to be independent from 
fossil fuels and to have 100 per cent of its energy 
demand covered by renewable energy. Already 
144 countries have set renewable energy targets 
(REN21, 2014). Some aim to cover 100 per cent of 
their electricity supply by renewable energy, such 
as the Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue, Tokelau, Tuvalu and 
Scotland. Germany’s Renewable Energy Sources 
Act provides for “constantly and cost effectively” 
increasing the share of renewable energy sources 
in electricity supply, to reach 80 per cent by 2050. 
Experience shows that countries have made rapid 
progress when they integrate climate policy into 
their core development strategy, lay out a long-
term strategic vision, and build wide-ranging 
political support for a new approach. More details 
on policies are provided in section 4.2.3.
Not only are countries active, but also regions, 
cities and companies have joined together to 
launch international cooperative initiatives (ICIs) to 
pursue sustainable development, environmental 
protection and climate change mitigation 
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objectives. These initiatives, which in some cases 
include national governments, have the potential 
to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
in support of, and potentially beyond, national 
emission reduction pledges (UNEP, 2013). Interest 
is increasing in these efforts, as was noted at the 
UN Secretary General’s Climate Change Summit in 
New York, in September 20142 and in the UNFCCC 
negotiations3. Over the last year, some estimates 
have become available on the possible impact 
of the targets of a few ICIs (Appendix 4-B). The 
collective impact of these initiatives could add 
up to a substantial global emissions reduction. 
But further research has to determine whether 
these reductions are additional to current 
government action.
4 .1 .6 Investment Requirements
Scaling up the many efforts described above in 
order to reach emission targets will take consider-
able investment – one estimate is US$ 44 trillion 
over 40 years to limit global warming to 2 oC4 (IEA, 
2014a). Although a significant amount of public and 
private investment is already flowing into energy 
efficiency and renewable energy, it is far below 
what is needed. Investment in energy efficiency 
was estimated to be between US$ 310 and 
US$ 360 billion in 2012 (IEA, 2014b) and in 
renewable energy about US$ 244 billion in 2012 
(IEA, 2014b), with the latter figure estimated 
to be US$ 250 billion in 2013 (IEA, 2014g). 
Therefore a greater policy push is required to 
enhance investment in this direction. To make 
it attractive for investors to invest in low-carbon 
and resource-efficient assets, the financial, policy 
and technological risks need to be reduced, 
general investment conditions need to be 
improved, financing costs need to be lowered 
and government budget support made available 
(GGGI, 2014; NCE, 2014).
4 .2 Spotlight: energy efficiency 
has benefits for all
4 .2 .1 Introduction
As in past emission gap reports, this chapter 
reviews successful policies and measures that 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and at the same 
time support development. This year’s focus is on 
improving energy efficiency.
Energy efficiency improvements are defined here as 
a reduction of energy use per unit of energy services 
delivered, for example, a reduction of the energy used 
to heat 1 m2 of a home, or to drive 1 km with a car. This 
could also mean delivering more services with the 
same amount of energy. These improvements could 
be technical, as in replacing existing equipment 
with more energy efficient equipment (for example, 
energy efficient light bulbs), or behavioural, in which 
people use equipment more efficiently (for example, 
adjusting the thermostat setting on heating and 
cooling appliances).
Table 4.1 shows the substantial potential of energy 
efficiency improvements as part of a package 
of approaches to reduce global emissions. More 
specific estimates are presented in Section 4.2.2, 
which also reviews the multiple benefits to be 
garnered from energy efficiency improvements, 
beyond energy savings alone. Section 4.2.3 
summarises policies and measures to improve 
energy efficiency in key sectors.
4 .2 .2 The multiple benefits of improving 
energy efficiency
The impacts of energy efficiency measures go 
far beyond energy savings and bring multiple 
benefits in line with the SDGs. An understanding of 
these could improve the benefit-cost assessment 
of energy efficiency outcomes and also show that 
it is unnecessary to trade environmental goals off 
against economic and social development ones. 
____________________ 
2  The Chair’s summary is available online at: http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/2014/09/2014-climate-change-summary-chairs-summary/
3 The Ad-hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action’s draft text on Accelerating the implementation of enhanced pre-2020 climate action is 
available online at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/adp2/eng/8drafttext.pdf
4 However, these investment costs are offset by nearly US$ 115 trillion in fuel savings in a scenario that lowers emissions enough to stay within the 2 ˚C limit.
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Many of the benefits are derived from two effects: 
a:  lower energy use which increases environ-
mental performance, disposable income, and/
or productivity, or 
b: investments in energy efficiency goods and 
services which increase spending in the 
economy5 (IEA, 2014e).
One way to look at the multiple advantages of 
improving energy efficiency is to divide them into 
environmental, social and economic benefits, as in 
the following paragraphs.
Environmental benefits
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions
Energy efficiency represents one of the most 
important pillars in efforts to decarbonize the 
global energy system and achieve the world’s 
climate protection objectives. Improving energy 
efficiency is prominently featured in government 
strategies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
because of its significant potential to do so. 
Compared to other measures, improving energy 
efficiency is generally one of the most cost-
effective options and can be implemented quickly 
(IIASA, 2012; IEA 2013a, 2013b; UNFCCC, 2014).
Some ongoing improvement of energy efficiency 
is indicated by the 1.6 per cent per year worldwide 
decline of energy intensity between 2002 and 
20126 (IEA, 2014b). These improvements of course 
come at a price, with the annual investment in 
energy efficiency noted above to be US$ 310–360 
billion in 2012 (IEA, 2014b).
While there has been steady progress over the past 
decade, there is great potential to further increase 
the rate of energy efficiency improvements (IEA, 
2014c) and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
extent to which greenhouse gas emissions can be 
reduced depends on both the emissions intensity 
of energy supply and use, and the effectiveness 
of those energy efficiency measures in reducing 
energy consumption. Improvements in the energy 
efficiency of energy consuming technologies 
and practices in 11 OECD countries over the past 
four decades saved 1 336 million tonnes of oil 
equivalents (Mtoe) in 2012, an amount larger than 
total final consumption of any other single source 
of fuel (IEA, 2014b).
A recent assessment (UDP, in preparation) provides 
world and G20 national- and sector-specific 
estimates of the emissions reduction potential 
associated with energy efficiency measures. The 
findings of this assessment, which are consistent 
with related studies (Appendix 4-C), highlight a 
significant emissions reduction potential through 
energy efficiency improvements, in particular in 
the power generation and industry sectors.
By this estimate, energy efficiency improvements 
worldwide could abate 22–24 Gt CO
2
e in the period 
2015–2030 (or 2.5–3.3 Gt CO
2
e annually in 2030) 
relative to a baseline scenario. This corresponds to 
a reduction in primary energy demand of about 
5-7 per cent over the same fifteen-year period. 
Cumulative emission reductions attributable to 
improvements in energy efficiency over the period 
2015-2030 represent about one-fifth of all cost 
effective emission reductions.7
Depending on the assumptions, estimates 
are higher (Appendix 4-C). For example, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014a) reports 
that end-use fuel and electricity efficiency could 
save 6.8 Gt CO
2
e in 2030, and power generation 
efficiency and fossil fuel switching could save 
0.3 Gt CO
2
e, also in 2030. An assessment by the 
____________________ 
5 Much of the research material for this section is sourced from the IEA’s Multiple Benefits of Energy Efficiency (IEA, 2014c). More details on the subject can be found 
there (see http://www.iea.org/W/bookshop/475-Capturing_the_Multiple_Benefits_of_Energy_Efficiency )
6 Energy intensity is an indicator of the energy efficiency of a country and is defined as the amount of primary energy used per unit of GDP of a country. But energy 
intensity does not only reflect an economy’s energy efficiency; it also reflects the mix and type of economic activity. However, if the structure and level of economic 
activity remains relatively stable, then trends in energy intensity can serve as a proxy for changes in energy efficiency.
7 These emission reduction estimates relate to abatement costs that would be economically efficient to incur in the period to 2030 (on average, worldwide) if carbon 
emissions were priced at US$ 70 per tonne over that same period.
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German Aerospace Centre (EREC, 2012) estimates 
that 13 Gt CO
2
e could be saved in 2030 through 
energy efficiency improvements alone.
Reducing air pollution
Emissions from fossil-fuels and biomass burning 
account for the majority of energy-related 
air pollution. The emitted substances include 
particulate matter (PM), precursors of tropospheric 
(the lower layer of the atmosphere) ozone (O
3
), 
nitrogen oxides (NO
X
), sulphur dioxide (SO
2
), 
carbon monoxide (CO) and organic compounds 
and metals. These compounds have a range of 
harmful impacts. The most recent global burden 
of disease report (Lim et al., 2012) estimated 
that in 2010 there were 3.5 million premature 
deaths from indoor smoke from solid fuels and 
another 3 million premature deaths from urban 
air pollution (ClimateWorks and World Bank, 2014). 
In addition, air pollution causes major crop losses. 
It was estimated that one pollutant alone, ozone, 
causes annual crop losses of around 79–121 million 
tonnes (reference year 2000), equivalent to about 
US$ 11–18 billion (Avnery et al., 2011).
Energy efficiency improvements can reduce air 
pollutant impacts by lowering the burning of 
fossil fuels and hence their air-polluting emissions, 
leading to health benefits in addition to those 
described in the health and well-being section 
below. A recent study showed that nearly 100 000 
premature deaths could be avoided annually in 
Brazil, China the EU, India, Mexico and the USA 
by 2030 through energy efficiency measures in 
the transport, buildings and industrial sectors 
(ClimateWorks and World Bank, 2014).
Economic benefits
Improvements in energy efficiency can produce 
significant positive macroeconomic impacts such 
as increases in GDP, public budgets, employment, 
and national competitiveness, as well as improved 
trade balances and reduced energy prices.
Economic output and public budget impacts
Investment in energy efficiency implies a transfer of 
capital from energy supply to less energy-intensive 
activities. This can have significant impacts on 
the wider economy if the transfer involves a 
restructuring of the economy to more labour-
intensive activities. Both energy cost savings and 
increased investment in energy efficiency goods 
and services can lead to spending throughout the 
economy and increased economic activity. 
Policy makers tend to think of energy efficiency 
policies in terms of their costs to the public budget 
such as costs for implementing regulations, 
information and enforcement measures. For 
financial incentives using public funds, the costs 
include the value of the subsidy8 and administrative 
costs. Moreover, in countries with substantial levels 
of energy taxes, energy efficiency programmes 
also trigger reductions in energy tax revenues 
which must be compensated for elsewhere.
However, the more positive effects on the public 
budget are often overlooked. These include: 
1:  direct effects such as reductions in operational 
expenditure and capital expenditure for the 
public sector itself; and 
2:  indirect effects such as increases in tax revenues 
from the sales of energy efficiency-related goods 
and services; or reductions in unemployment 
because of stimulated spending and economic 
activity. 
A few studies have confirmed that energy efficiency 
programmes have positive benefits to the public 
sector in that around 50 per cent to 75 per cent 
of the total investment in energy efficiency is 
returned to the public budget9 (Lehr and Lutz, et 
al., 2012; Kuckshinrichs et al., 2013).
____________________ 
8 Financial incentives can also be funded through user charges and other private sources, which would not be counted as public budget expenditure.
9 In terms of the public investment alone rather than total investment in energy efficiency; in Germany, Kuckshinrichs et al. (2013) estimated that the return on 
investment for the public budget is up to 7:1.
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Employment effects
Investment in energy efficiency programmes 
has significant potential to create jobs, both 
directly through action that requires firms to 
carry out the work, and indirectly because of the 
boost in economic output caused by investment 
and energy cost reductions, as noted above10. 
However, it is important to clarify whether there is 
a net or gross job creation, since the employment 
produced may only shift jobs between sectors. 
Research shows a wide range of estimates for 
changes to employment, from zero net jobs across 
all sectors in G20 countries per million euros spent 
on energy efficiency11 (UDP, in preparation), to 19 
jobs per million euros invested in energy efficiency 
in the buildings sector in Europe12 (Janssen and 
Staniaszek, 2012). 
Not only is the number of jobs created important, 
but also the value of those jobs. This depends 
on various factors such as labour intensity, local 
content, wage rates and temporal durability. In 
the USA, it is estimated that US$ 1 million spent 
on energy efficiency in retrofitting buildings and 
mass transit generates 2.5–4 times more jobs than 
the same amount spent on oil and natural gas 
because of the higher labour intensity associated 
with energy efficiency work (Pollin et al., 2009). The 
effectiveness of an energy efficiency programme 
in creating jobs will also depend on the size and 
structure of financing and the type of energy 
savings intervention.
Benefits to industrial productivity
Energy efficiency measures in industry have been 
shown to provide a range of direct and indirect non-
energy benefits for businesses (Lilly and Pearson, 
1999; Pearson and Skumatz, 2002). These include 
reduced environmental compliance costs, enhanced 
productivity and competitiveness, decreased 
maintenance costs, extended life of equipment, 
reduced waste-disposal costs, and improved process 
and product quality (IEA, 2014b). Worrell et al. (2003) 
analysed 72 case studies and found that the non-
energy benefits can also extend to improvement in 
individual working conditions, such as less noise, and 
higher levels of safety and worker morale. However, 
these impacts are very difficult to quantify. The 
implementation of energy efficiency measures has 
also been associated with the generation of business 
opportunities and access to new markets, as new 
energy-efficient technologies are manufactured 
and traded (Mundaca et al., 2010). Although it is 
difficult to compare studies, since every industrial 
plant is different, there is evidence to suggest that 
the value of the benefits related to improved 
industrial productivity and operation could be 
up to 2.5 times the value of energy cost savings 
(IEA, 2014e).
Social benefits
Health and well-being from more 
comfortable buildings
There is a growing body of evidence that energy 
efficiency measures contribute to public health. 
As mentioned above, there are significant health 
benefits due to reduced air pollution. Energy-
efficiency improvements in buildings (improved 
insulation, heating and ventilation systems 
and increased efficiency of other energy using 
devices) can also lead to a warmer, drier, more 
comfortable indoor environment (Milne and 
Boardman, 2000). Studies show that this improved 
indoor environment reduces respiratory and 
cardiovascular disease, allergies, arthritis and rheu-
matism and creates feedback loops generating 
improved mental health. Health improvements in 
turn generate wider social and economic impacts, 
including lower spending on public health.
____________________ 
10 Causal links are difficult to establish but the indirect jobs appear to be more durable with potential to last the period of the energy efficiency improvement itself, 
i.e. the 20 year lifetime of an improved heating system, rather than the shorter lifetime of an energy efficiency programme.
11 While the study shows nearly no change to global employment as a result of energy efficiency improvements, this result obscures the significant differences 
between regions. For most regions there are net employment increases but employment falls in some regions where “the domestic economy is affected by higher 
prices and trade relationships with the rest of the world” (UDP, in preparation).
12 The Janssen and Staniaszek (2012) estimate of 19 jobs per Euro 1 million invested in upgrading the energy efficiency of the building stock represents an arithmetic 
average of the results of 35 data points from 20 sources. 
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Often the health and well-being impacts alone 
outweigh the benefits of energy savings and 
emission reductions, not only in societal value, 
but also in financial terms. In fact, health benefits 
of energy efficiency measures in buildings are 
estimated to account for up to 75 per cent 
of overall benefits (IEA, 2014e). However, it is 
difficult to determine the causal link between 
energy efficiency and health outcomes due to 
the complex nature of human health and the 
complex interactions of different physical, social 
and economic drivers (Evans et al., 2003).
Access to energy 
The alleviation of poverty in both developed 
and developing countries is a central concern 
to society. Access to modern energy services 
is fundamental to pulling communities out of 
poverty by providing the energy required for social 
and economic development.
It is estimated that nearly 1.3 billion people in 
developing countries do not have access to 
electricity. More than 95 per cent of them are either 
in sub-Saharan Africa or developing countries in 
Asia (IEA, 2013a). In other countries with better 
access to electricity, fuel shortages sometimes 
lead to disruptions in fuel supply and temporary 
interruptions in access to energy. Another 
important issue is that the expansion of energy 
infrastructure in developing countries sometimes 
does not extend to the poorest households, so 
special programmes are needed to reach these 
people. Cook-stove improvements are an example 
of an energy efficiency initiative that can yield 
better energy services while providing other social 
benefits such as reduced indoor air pollution13. 
Improving the energy efficiency of energy 
infrastructure can also be interpreted as providing 
more people with access to energy services for the 
same primary inputs and costs.
Alleviating fuel poverty
Energy affordability issues are both a cause and 
a symptom of poverty. Fuel or energy poverty 
describes a situation in which energy services are 
not affordable enough to maintain healthy living 
conditions. In OECD countries, fuel poverty is often 
defined as a situation in which households need to 
spend more than 10 per cent of their income on 
achieving adequate levels of energy services in the 
home. By this definition, just under 20 per cent of 
the UK’s population is in fuel poverty and around 
15 per cent in the USA. European studies estimate 
that 50–125 million Europeans are fuel poor14.
In general, the poor are more likely to live in inefficient 
housing, have less access to energy subsidies and 
therefore face higher relative energy costs. Energy 
saving measures in buildings can contribute to 
improving this situation by reducing heating energy 
bills. Several OECD countries, including Australia, 
Ireland, New Zealand, the USA and the UK have used 
energy efficiency policies to address fuel poverty 
with positive results (IEA, 2014e).
Barriers to energy efficiency
Given the significant benefits associated with 
improvements in energy efficiency, it seems 
surprising that there is an energy efficiency gap 
in that the technical potential remains unfulfilled. 
The reason for this is that certain barriers, what 
economists call market failures, prevent energy 
efficiency measures from being carried out, even 
when their costs can be recovered quickly through 
energy savings.
The main market failures and barriers are:
- Imperfect information: this is probably the most 
common barrier. Energy consumers may not 
understand the benefits of improved efficiency 
because they lack sufficient information about 
the energy performance of equipment or the 
trend of future energy prices. 
____________________ 
13 See the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves for more details (http://carbonfinanceforcookstoves.org/).
14 European fuel Poverty and Energy Efficiency (EPEE) project: www.fuel-poverty.org/
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- Split incentives: this is sometimes known as the 
landlord-tenant problem where the benefits of 
investing in energy efficiency do not accrue to 
the investor. For example when a house is built, 
the upfront costs of better energy performance 
are borne by the builder but may not be 
recouped from the house renter who benefits 
from lower energy bills.
- Externalities: in the context of energy efficiency 
this refers to a situation in which the full costs 
of energy use are not paid by the user, who is 
therefore not motivated to invest in energy 
efficiency and save energy. This is important 
in countries where energy is subsidised and 
energy prices are low. 
Other important market barriers are the higher 
upfront costs often associated with better energy 
efficiency and the lack of access to finance for 
covering these costs. Resistance to change and 
human inertia are also powerful deterrents to 
taking action.
Another possible obstacle to obtaining the full 
benefits of energy efficiency improvements is the 
so-called rebound effect that some experts believe 
can undermine energy savings expected from 
efficiency projects (Box 4.2).
Policy intervention is needed to overcome these 
obstacles, market failures and barriers,  to encou-
rage greater improvements in energy efficiency. 
These are further discussed in the section 4.2.3.
Key points about benefits
Improvements in energy efficiency are among 
the most cost-effective measures for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, the 
economic, social, and environmental benefits of 
energy efficiency measures other than energy 
demand reduction could significantly outweigh 
energy cost savings in terms of value and level of 
priority for governments.
The benefits of energy efficiency can affect all levels 
of society – from individual benefits of increased 
health, well-being, disposable income and access 
to energy services and employment, through 
increasing industrial productivity and profits, and 
on to national-level macroeconomic benefits such 
as increases to GDP, trade and public budgets, 
and reduced air pollution and greenhouse 
gas emissions.
The benefits of energy efficiency improvements 
are generated from:
1: energy cost reductions, leading to increased 
disposable income, wellbeing, environmental 
performance, and competitiveness; and 
2: increased investment and spending on 
 energy efficiency. 
Ultimately both types of effects can lead to 
an increase in economic activity, justifying 
the inclusion of energy efficiency measures in 
mainstream economic policy. In addition, the social 
and environmental benefits from improvements 
in energy efficiency suggest that energy saving 
measures should be embedded in strategies to 
achieve the SDGs.
Although the benefits of energy efficiency 
measures are large, there remain many barriers to 
implementing them. Policy intervention is clearly 
needed to realize these benefits.
4 .2 .3 Policies and measures to improve energy 
efficiency in key sectors
There are many examples of energy efficiency 
policies and measures adopted in various regions, 
countries, states and cities that are transferable. 
There are also various measures and targets that 
can help accelerate energy efficiency in economies 
(Box 4.3). Rather than providing an inventory of 
such measures, this chapter aims to give specific 
examples of successful action that has made 
a difference in key sectors. We focus on three 
sectors that comprise 95 per cent of world energy 
use: buildings, including lighting and appliances 
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Box 4 .2: The rebound effect
The rebound effect, as applied to energy consumption, refers to a situation in which an efficiency improvement 
is counteracted by additional energy consumption (IPCC, 2014; Santarius, 2012). One classic example is the 
increase in fuel efficiency of passenger cars which some authors claim has led to an increase in the kilometers 
driven per person (Sorrell et al., 2009).
On one hand, it can be argued that an increase in consumption enhances welfare and therefore is a good thing. 
On the other hand, if the aim is to reduce overall energy use and greenhouse gas and other emissions as far as 
possible, then the rebound effect makes this strategy less effective.
Three classes of rebound have been identified (Santarius, 2012). Financial rebound means that cost savings of 
energy efficiency measures stimulate higher energy consumption, for example, when households invest energy 
savings in further consumption. Material rebound means that the act of improving energy efficiency also involves 
some energy costs (for example, that it takes energy to produce the wall insulation used for reducing household 
heating). Finally, psychological rebound has to do with consciously or unconsciously consuming more, just 
because it is assumed that, with some new, efficient appliance, it does not matter anymore.
The limited number of studies makes it impossible to generalize about the impact of rebound in a typical energy 
efficiency project. Some authors estimate the rebound effect to be 10–30 per cent for household energy use and 
buildings, and as large as 60 per cent for mobility and it can be higher in developing countries where energy 
demand is unsaturated (Sorrell et al., 2009; Thomas and Azevedo, 2013).
A limited amount of work has been devoted to solutions to the rebound effect. One proposal is to tax profits 
arising from efficiency improvements (von Weizsacker et al., 2009); another is to introduce a carbon price in 
combination with energy efficiency measures to reduce increased spending on carbon-intensive activities. But 
the question remains whether some of the rebound effect can be viewed as an acceptable price for society to 
pay to get the multiple benefits described in this chapter. For example, energy efficiency measures have been 
known to provide benefits such as stimulating jobs and economic activity, but these in turn stimulate further 
energy use. Is some lessening of the climate mitigation effectiveness of energy efficiency projects an acceptable 
trade-off for societal welfare gains?
Considering the potential impact of the rebound effect on energy efficiency policies and measures, it is important 
to better understand its impacts and to take it into account when charting strategies for mitigating climate change.
(38 per cent), industry (33 per cent), and transport 
(24 per cent)15. In addition, we look at the electricity 
production sector. 
Buildings
The scope for improving the efficiency with which 
energy is used in building design, construction 
and operation is large. Recent advances in 
materials and know-how mean that new energy 
efficient buildings can use 60 to 90 per cent less 
energy than conventional buildings of a similar 
type and configuration, suggesting they would 
be cost-effective in all countries and climate zones 
(GEA 2012). Energy use in buildings represents a 
complex interaction between physical, economic 
and human systems. Many policies have 
focused on addressing individual components 
within these systems. Although this approach 
has been successful up to now in improving 
____________________ 
15 Data for 2010 are calculated in terms of primary energy, taking into account global energy conversion efficiencies for power plants. Use of energy for non-energy 
purposes is not taken into account. The calculation is based on data from the IEA energy balances from both OECD and non-OECD countries.
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energy efficiency, a more integrated approach 
is required to drive further improvements – that 
is, an approach covering the building shell, fixed 
and plug-in appliances, energy generation and 
enabling technologies, and occupant behaviour 
(Box 4.4). 
For new structures, buildings codes stipulating 
minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) 
have become the most popular policy instrument 
for reducing energy demand. If stringent building 
codes are not universally introduced, high energy 
use and emissions risk being locked in for decades, 
leading to a 33 per cent increase in global energy 
use for buildings by 2050 instead of a decrease 
of 46 per cent (GEA, 2012). To achieve real energy 
savings, these codes need to be enforced, reviewed 
and regularly strengthened (IEA, 2011a). Virtually 
all OECD countries and several developing 
countries have building codes in place (IEA 2008)16, 
Box 4 .3: Cross-cutting measures that support energy efficiency
Box 4 .4: Energy for heating, cooling and hot water
A number of measures can be used to improve energy efficiency across the economy.  The main measures include:
•	 putting	a	price	on	carbon	e.g.	carbon	trading,	carbon	tax;
•	 energy	efficiency	targets;
•	 energy	intensity	reduction	targets	-	decoupling	gross	domestic	product	from	energy	use/emissions;
•	 emission	reduction	targets;
•	 setting	carbon-neutral	targets;	and
•	 removing	fuel	subsidies	to	reflect	the	true	price	of	energy.
Naturally, not all measures are suitable for all countries. In addition, success depends on regular monitoring, 
verification and enforcement.
The provision of heating, cooling and hot water is estimated to account for roughly half of global energy 
consumption in buildings (IEA, 2012c). Some cities are adopting district energy systems to supply thermal energy 
(heat, cooling and hot water) and in some cases electricity to buildings. District energy systems coordinate the 
supply of heating, cooling and power and in so doing optimize energy use and maximize energy efficiency. While 
district energy systems are appropriate for different climate zones (IPCC, 2014), up to now they have been used 
mostly to provide heating in cooler climates – in Europe and the USA. Nonetheless there are now a growing 
number of district energy systems providing cooling in warmer climates such as in Dubai, Kuwait and Singapore.
which require a level of insulation that substantially 
reduces energy demand. For example, standards 
in place in Japan, in the EU and in selected states 
of the USA (HSBC, 2014) typically call for a level of 
energy consumption that is only one-quarter the 
level of non-insulated buildings. 
Although, energy performance standards have 
primarily been applied to new buildings, the UK’s 
2011 Energy Act has banned the rental or sale of 
buildings in the worst performing energy classes 
from 2018 onwards. To achieve significant energy 
and emissions reductions in the building sector, 
there is a growing consensus that new buildings 
must have net-zero energy or nearly zero-energy 
performance. Net-zero energy buildings are those 
with on-site renewable energy systems, such as 
photovoltaics, wind turbines or solar thermal 
that, over the year or for a stated period, generate 
____________________ 
16 A key factor in the success of building codes is their ambition level. With this in mind, it is important to note that many countries have adopted very ambitious codes.
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as much energy as they consume (IPCC, 2014). 
Increased construction of low-energy and efficient 
buildings can be encouraged mainly through the 
establishment of targets for market share in new 
constructions, updates of building codes and 
demonstration projects17.
Energy-plus buildings – buildings that produce 
more energy than they consume – represent a 
relatively recent concept that is being applied to 
pilot and demonstration projects (Wang et al., 
2009; Miller and Buys 2010). There have been a 
handful of commercial and residential buildings 
that have demonstrated they are energy-plus 
buildings. Some cities, such as Boston in the USA, 
have developed an Energy Plus green building 
programme to promote energy efficient buildings 
throughout the city.
There are other measures that can improve the 
energy efficiency of existing buildings, including 
energy audits, energy rating schemes, incentives 
to encourage investment, as well as education 
and awareness programmes (IEA, 2014d). Some 
important energy efficiency measures target 
specific building components such as:
1: performance requirements and labelling of 
windows and other glazed areas; 
2: reduced energy demand from heating, 
ventilation and air conditioning systems 
through, for example, increased efficiency, 
labelling and correct sizing; and 
3: promoting energy management and controls 
to reduce energy use and capture energy 
efficiency opportunities (IEA, 2014d).
____________________ 
17 The European Performance Buildings Directive requires that all new buildings in European Union member states are nearly-zero energy buildings by 2020, with 
all new buildings occupied and owned by public authorities being nearly zero-energy buildings by 2018 (European Union 2010).  Some European member states 
have already moved to ambitious performance goals of low- or zero-emissions buildings (Hermelink et al. 2013). California has set a target that all new residential 
constructions are to be net-zero energy by 2020 and all new commercial constructions will be net-zero energy by 2030 (CA, 2013).
18 For some devices, such as game consoles, up to 80 per cent of the energy consumption is used just to maintain a network connection. Policy measures mandating 
minimum performance standards could reverse this situation (IEA, 2014f ).
19 Detailed assessments of energy performance standards can be found in Ürge-Vorsatz et al., (2007); Koeppel and Ürge-Vorsatz, (2007); Boza-Kiss et al., (2013); 
Siderius and Nakagami, (2013); and Molenbroek et al., (2014).
20 The success of any standards and labelling programme depends on an effective strategy for monitoring, verification and enforcement (Ellis et al., 2010; IEA, 2010) 
to ensure the delivery of energy, financial and climate benefits.
Appliances and lighting
Appliances include all types of equipment used 
in buildings – refrigerators, air conditioners, 
televisions, equipment for water heating, etc. 
Electrical appliances, excluding heating and 
cooling systems and lighting, typically account 
for 20 per cent or more of residential energy 
consumption18 (IPCC, 2014). 
It is now technically possible to substantially 
reduce the energy use of appliances, equipment 
and lighting without diminishing their service 
levels or working effectiveness. Two key measures 
are typically used to this end:
- Energy performance standards which encourage 
rapid adoption of higher efficiency products19. 
The number of different products subject to 
energy performance standards has grown from 
42 to 55 between 2004 and 2013 (EES, 2013); 
and
- Labelling which informs consumers about the 
comparative energy consumption of products 
and provides an incentive for manufacturers to 
innovate in order to gain a market advantage. 
Mandatory energy labelling has been applied 
to many appliances and lighting products (Ellis 
et al., 2010; IEA, 2010).
The combination of energy performance 
standards and labelling in its various forms are 
often complementary tools applied to the same 
product type20. The number of countries with a 
standards and labelling programme has grown 
rapidly, from 50 to 81 between 2004 and 2013 
(EES, 2013). Among other challenges, these 
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programmes must keep up with technological 
developments that continuously produce new 
equipment of higher energy efficiency. This 
means that standards setting and labelling 
must be a flexible and responsive process.
There is also large potential to save energy in 
lighting applications. This includes residential 
lighting, replaceable by LEDs and controls; 
commercial and industrial lighting, replaceable by 
linear fluorescent lamps and LEDs; and outdoor 
lighting, replaceable by high intensity discharge 
lamps – LEDs – and controls. One of the most 
concerted efforts to reduce energy use in lighting 
is UNEP’s En.lighten Initiative21.
Industry
There is substantial potential for reducing energy 
use in the industrial sector. Fuel use for process 
heating can be reduced through heat recovery 
and better insulation, as well as by modifying the 
production process. The electricity requirements 
of driving equipment such as compressors, fans, 
and pumps can be reduced by optimising motor 
systems. Not least, energy efficiency can also be 
substantially improved by low- or no-cost changes 
to management practices in industrial facilities 
(Reinaud and Goldberg, 2013).
Implementing these and other measures requires 
effective policies, but no single approach 
dominates in the industrial sector. Governments 
seldom implement isolated policies: they prefer 
policy packages that address several energy 
efficiency improvements at the same time22. In 
addition, governments often try to avoid the 
application of stringent and costly measures that 
reduce the competitiveness of their industries.
Governments promote industrial energy efficiency 
by helping companies identify the most cost 
effective efficiency investments, mainly through 
energy audits or in-depth energy reviews. They 
also encourage industries to make efficiency 
investments by reducing the payback time of these 
investments, typically through subsidies and loans; 
by mandating, mostly through energy-saving 
targets and emissions trading; or by encouraging 
implementation, for example through voluntary 
agreements and differentiated electricity pricing.
Governments generally adopt policies that allow 
flexibility as to how their industries achieve 
energy savings (Reinaud and MacNulty, 2014). 
This flexibility is needed because policies have to 
be applicable to industries that encompass a wide 
variety of sub-sectors, all with different energy 
consumption profiles (World Energy Council and 
Ademe, 2013). The following policies and measures 
have proved to be particularly promising:
- Energy management programmes that require 
or encourage companies to adopt energy 
management guidelines such as ISO 50001 
have been introduced in several countries23 
(IEA & IIP, 2012). Experience has shown 
that government-led energy management 
programmes are most effective when they are 
part of a broader government programme or 
a voluntary agreement between industry and 
government, coupled with a mix of incentives, 
supports and the threat of regulation (IEA & IIP, 
2012; Reinaud and Goldberg, 2013).
- A corporate energy-saving programme is a 
comprehensive effort to reduce energy use 
in the industrial sector and is usually country-
specific24. China has one of the most extensive 
of these, the Top-10,000 Energy-Consuming 
____________________ 
21 En.lighten is a partnership of more than 60 countries committed to phasing out the use of inefficient incandescent lamps and replacing them with energy efficient 
lighting sources by 2016 (http://www.enlighten-initiative.org/). 
22 Most policy packages are very country-, sector- and size-specific.
23 Energy management systems establish a framework for industrial facilities to manage their energy use, and require companies to adopt a suite of procedures and 
practices to ensure systematic tracking, analysis and planning of energy use in industry.
24 For more details on energy management programmes, see: http://www.iipnetwork.org/databases/programs
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____________________ 
25 This is a package of policies and measures including a specific energy-saving target assigned to each of around 15 000 Chinese enterprises, and the requirement to 
adopt the Chinese energy management system standard. Each company’s 5-year energy-saving target has to be reached by the end of the current Five Year Plan 
(2011–2015; Ke et al., 2012).
26 Included are energy-intensive sectors such as aluminium, cement, chlor-alkali, fertilizer, iron and steel and pulp and paper. Certificates are issued to companies 
that can verify their energy savings and these certificates can be traded between the companies. This programme sets a plant-specific energy reduction target 
compared to its baseline, with the average reduction target being 4.8 per cent between 2012 and 2015 (CDKN, 2013).
27 In the EU, the standard for electric motors is combined with an obligation to install equipment for power-speed control (Reinaud and MacNulty, 2014).
28 ETS are operational in the EU, California, several provinces in Canada, several cities and provinces in China (with plans to extend it to the entire country in the 
coming three years), South-Korea, Kazakhstan and New Zealand (Höhne et al., 2014).
29 Canada, Japan and the USA have emission standards for heavy-duty vehicles. China has plans to introduce them (EC, 2014).
30 Harmonizing test methods and ensuring appropriate monitoring, verification and evaluation are among the most problematic issues.
31 The Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI) sponsored by, among others, the IEA and UNEP is promoting improvements in global average automotive fuel economy. 
The target is a 50 per cent reduction in litres per 100 km (L/100km) between 2005 and 2030, from about 8 L/100 km to 4 L/100 km. This would result in about a 50 
per cent reduction in the fuel use of all cars on the road by 2050 (IEA, 2012b).
32 For example, Korea has implemented a tyre labelling programme to promote reduced rolling-resistant tyres.
Enterprises25, and another example is India’s 
Perform, Achieve and Trade programme, which 
sets a specific energy consumption targets for 
478 companies26.
- Energy performance standards contribute to 
energy savings in industry but are usually only 
applied to specific equipment or technologies. 
The most popular application of these standards 
is to electric motors. Up to now, 44 countries 
have such standards, including Brazil, China, 
South Korea, and the USA (EES 2013)27. China 
has applied specific energy efficiency standards 
to the production of 39 industrial commodities.
- Emissions trading systems (ETS) are proliferating 
across the globe and are now in place or 
scheduled for implementation in many 
regions28. Although current low price levels 
limit their impact, future higher prices could 
change this situation.
Transport
Worldwide, more than half of oil consumption is 
for transport. Three-quarters of the energy used 
in this sector is consumed on roads (IEA, 2012a). 
Without strong new mitigation policies, fuel use 
for road transport is projected to double between 
2010 and 2050 (IEA, 2012b).
Currently, the principal measure used to improve 
energy efficiency in the transport sector is to 
impose mandatory fuel economy standards 
on road vehicles – these are in place in most 
OECD member countries and China (IEA, 2012a). 
For freight transport, the development of fuel 
economy standards is less advanced29, as the wide 
variety of freight transport modes makes them 
challenging to set30.
In addition to fuel economy standards, measures 
such as labelling, taxes and incentives can help 
increase vehicle efficiency and accelerate the 
market penetration of more efficient vehicles31 
(IEA, 2012b). Vehicle fuel efficiency can also be 
boosted by improving the efficiency of non-fuel 
related components, such as tyres, air conditioning 
and lighting (IEA, 2012a). For example, reducing 
the rolling-resistance of tyres and promoting 
optimal inflation levels are effective measures for 
reducing energy use32.
Ecodriving provides a further means of improving 
the efficiency with which energy is used in the 
transport sector. It involves the modification of 
driving habits to conserve fuel use (for example, 
by paying special attention to driving at steady 
speeds and low rpm), which can reduce average 
fuel use by 10 per cent or more (IEA, 2012b).
Land use planning and management also plays an 
important role in improving the energy efficiency 
of transport by encouraging the greater use of 
public transport and reducing the overall need 
for motorized transport. It can do so by increasing 
density, so that public transportation can work at 
capacity. It can also reduce the distances between 
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residences, commercial areas and work places, 
so that it is easier and more convenient to travel 
by foot or bicycle. Zoning can also be used to 
discourage private vehicles and encourage more 
energy efficient modes of travel33.
Electricity production, transmission 
and distribution
In 2005, the overall efficiency of the energy 
system from primary energy to useful energy 
was only about 34 per cent (GEA, 2012). It is, 
however, possible to raise this level by saving 
energy at power plants and reducing losses during 
electricity distribution.
Despite the rapid expansion of renewable 
energy production in many countries, fossil 
fuel facilities will continue to play a significant 
role in energy production. Therefore legislation 
and incentives are needed to boost the energy 
efficiency of fossil fuel-based energy generation. 
At a technical level, energy can be saved by 
replacing conventional turbines with super- or 
ultra-super critical boilers or combined-cycle gas 
turbines. Energy can also be saved by improving 
____________________ 
33 For example, drivers in many German cities have to obtain a special sticker to drive in the green zone of these cities.
34 Network losses produce more than 700 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions each year.
35 Australia, Canada, China and the USA, among other countries, have introduced energy performance standards for distribution transformers.
36 These schemes have various names such as energy efficiency obligation schemes, energy saving initiatives or white certificate schemes.
37 In the USA, 25 states have utilities with such obligations (ACEEE, 2014). In the EU, eight member states have introduced these obligations, and eight more are 
planning to do so (Bean et al., 2014).
operating practices at electrical generation 
facilities, such that they operate near their design 
heat-rate values.
Electrical transmission and distribution networks 
are other areas with high potential for efficiency 
improvements. Worldwide, the cost of energy
losses in networks amounts to more than 
US$ 61 billion annually34 (Leonardo Energy, 2005). 
Most of these losses occur in the distribution 
system, and of those, one-third occur in 
transformers – the majority in distribution 
transformers (SEAD, 2013). Energy per-
formance standards for distribution trans-
formers can help reduce these losses35.
Some governments have created regulatory 
and other policies to ensure that energy utilities 
carry out energy efficiency improvements36. 
These schemes enable utilities to trade energy-
saving obligations and encourage competition in 
delivering energy services and meeting energy 
savings targets. Some schemes allow utilities to 
recover their costs while maintaining revenues 
and profits by sharing the costs and benefits with 
consumers37 (IEA, 2011b).
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